Note: This essay was updated on September 4, 2023. New sections were added to address common questions. Sections added: Application of Jihad Principles, Are there exceptional situations…, Modern Theories of Jihad.
In the two decades since 9/11, governments and media organizations hostile to Islam have produced non-stop anti-Muslim propaganda.
This propaganda has been used to justify US wars in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. It has been used to justify repressive legislation against Muslim minorities in non-Muslim countries like France, India, and Israel. Such propaganda has likewise been used to justify repressive legislation against the general population in Muslim countries governed by secular authoritarian regimes.
Much anti-Muslim propaganda centers on the claim that traditional Quranic doctrine on jihād legitimates terrorism. It legitimates the 9/11 attacks, as well as subsequent terrorist attacks carried out by groups like al-Qaeda and Daesh (ISIS).
It is false that jihād doctrine legitimates such terrorism. However, to this day, this point has not been explained with sufficient clarity. Consequently, there is significant confusion on the matter.
Islam and Violence
The first step is to clarify Islam’s stance on violence.
Islam is concerned with politics and government. Every government endorses violence in the form of law and warfare. Governments must utilize violence to enforce laws and punish criminals. Warfare utilizes violence to defend a people and its way of life. Warfare is also used to advance the interests of that people in its struggle with rival peoples for power and resources.
Islam endorses a specific form of government (khilāfa) which imposes Sharīʿa. The government defends the Muslim people (umma) and its way of life (Islām). Warfare (jihād) is also used to advance the interests of Muslims in their struggle with rival peoples for power and resources. These other peoples use war to establish power over Muslims, and Muslims use war to establish power over them. This is the nature of politics – a view usually referred to as “political realism” or “Realpolitik.” All governments, not just Islamic governments, operate in similar fashion.
Furthermore, all governments, not just Islamic governments, are based on hierarchical authority. The ruler (imām) and other high ranking political authorities are given responsibility for applying the law and waging war. To successfully apply laws or wage wars, careful planning and cooperation are necessary. Political authorities ensure the necessary planning and cooperation.
Consider how applying laws requires careful planning and cooperation.
In order to run a legal system, revenue must be gathered through taxation. Tax revenue is used to fund the training and salaries of qualified judges (qāḍīs). These judges are trained such that they know the law (Sharīʿa) and can apply relevant procedures to resolve cases in a fair, consistent, evidence-based manner.
Taxes also are used to pay police officers and provide them with the training and equipment necessary to perform their duties. Police officers arrest offenders, gather evidence, and enforce court judgements. The responsibility of the political authorities is to establish a system of this type. They must lay out a plan for gathering taxes, setting up courts, and setting up a police force. They must also ensure that the various personnel involved are cooperating together – the tax collectors, judges, and police. Without an appropriate system in place, the law cannot be applied properly.
When Muslims talk about full application of Sharīʿa, what is meant is that Muslim political authorities set up a proper legal system and then apply the Sharīʿa rules. Advocacy of Sharīʿa does not mean that random individuals take it upon themselves to violently punish people for Sharīʿa violations – doing so without adequate knowledge of the law, without proper judicial procedures, without the collection of evidence, and so on.
Hence, when Muslims say that theft should be punished by amputation of the hand, it does not mean that a random individual gets a knife and then chops off the hand of a person who he thinks has stolen something. Similarly, when Muslims say that adultery should be punished by stoning, it does not mean that a random individual gathers stones and then uses them to kill someone he thinks has committed adultery. This is vigilantism, and it is banned in all legal systems, including the Sharīʿa.
To be clear, when individual Muslims witness violations of the Sharīʿa, there are limited steps they can take to counter them – like verbally rebuking the wrongdoer, reporting him to the authorities, and (in certain cases) limited physical interventions – like restraining a thief. These fall under the general command given to all Muslims by Allah to enjoin good and forbid evil. As Allah says:
“Let there arise out of you a group of people inviting to all that is goodness, enjoining good and forbidding evil. And it is they who are the successful” Quran 3:104
The Prophet ﷺ also stated:
Whoever among you sees evil, let him change it with his hand. If he cannot do so, then with his tongue. If he cannot do so, then with his heart, which is the weakest level of faith. Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Kitāb al-Imān[1]
But these limited individual interventions are not the same as fully applying the Sharīʿa, which is something that only the legitimate Muslim government has the authority to do.
Here there is an important parallel. Just as political authorities are necessary for proper application of the Sharīʿa, they are also necessary for the waging of war – or jihād.
What Is Jihād?
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to clarify the concept of jihād. Jihād has particular aims. One of these aims is protecting Muslims – protecting their lives and property. A second related aim is to protect the religion of Islam, to spread this religion to new people and lands and to further the material interests of the umma.
The term “jihād” applies to both defensive wars and offensive wars fought with these aims. Defensive jihād is known as “jihād al-daf’”. Offensive jihād is known as “jihād al-ṭalab”.
During the Prophet’s life, he ﷺ waged defensive jihād wars like Uhud and Khandaq. He also waged offensive wars like the conquest of Makka. Shortly thereafter, the Prophet’s Companions waged offensive wars to conquer Byzantine and Sasanian lands.
Empires wage offensive wars of conquest, and it can be said that Muslims sought to establish an Islamic empire through such wars. Offensive wars of conquest waged by Muslims were similar to wars waged by the Greek empire (under Alexander), the Roman empire, the Byzantine empire, the Sasanian empire, the Chinese empire, the British empire, the French empire, etc.
Islamic legal texts (fiqh texts) lay down a number general principles for the waging of jihād. Three are especially important for our purposes.
First, jihād may only be waged if it has beneficial consequences for Islam and Muslims
Second, jihād must be waged in a manner which shows due respect to the lives of non-Muslims
Third, jihād campaigns are the responsibility of the political ruler, and may not be waged by random individuals.
Let us take a closer look at each of these principles:
First Principle: Jihād may only be waged if it has beneficial consequences for Islam and Muslims
Fiqh texts lay down a general principle for jihād warfare: Consideration must be given to the likely consequences of launching military attacks. The political leader (imām) must decide whether, on balance, launching military attacks has beneficial consequences (maṣlaḥa) for Islam and the Muslims.[1] Although some harmful consequences are acceptable, they should be outweighed by the beneficial consequences (al-muwāzana bayna al-maṣāliḥ wa al-mafāsid).
Thus, the leader must consider whether launching military attacks will have the beneficial consequence of advancing the aims of jihād. Will it help secure the life and property of Muslims? Will it protect Islam and help it spread? Or will it do the opposite? The leader is given the choice to refrain from jihād if it is likely to result in harmful consequences for Muslims.[2]
In his famous fiqh text Bidāya al-Mujtahid, Ibn Rushd writes:
“Is it permissible [for Muslims] to have a peace agreement [with non-Muslims]? Some scholars permit this without conditions if the ruler sees that it has beneficial consequences for Muslims. Other scholars hold it is only permissible when Muslims are facing severe difficulties like a civil war.”
Ibn Rushd, Bidāya al-Mujtahid wa Nihāya al-Muqtaṣid (Kitāb al-Jihād: al-Faṣl al-Sādis fī Jawāz al-Muhādana)
In other words, all scholars hold that it is permissible for Muslims to have a peace agreement when it has beneficial consequences for Muslims. However, some scholars stipulate that such an agreement should only be made where absolutely necessary.
In his influential fiqh text al-Mughnī, Ibn Qudāma articulates a similar perspective. He asserts that jihād expeditions should ideally be undertaken at least once per year. However, he clarifies that ultimately the decision to wage jihād depends on what is beneficial for Muslims. He states:
“[Jihād] is necessary once per year, except where there is an excuse – like if the Muslims are weak with regards to numbers or equipment; or if they are waiting for reinforcements to help them; or if the path [to enemy] is blocked by an obstacle or lacks feed for animals and water; or if it is known that [the enemy] has a good opinion of Islam, and it is hoped they will convert if war is postponed; and other things like that where there are beneficial consequences for leaving off fighting. [In such cases] it is permitted to leave off fighting, and make a peace agreement. For the Prophet ﷺ made a peace agreement with the Quraysh for ten years, and left off fighting them until they broke the agreement. He also postponed fighting other Arab tribes even though there was no peace agreement with them.”
Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī (Kitāb al-Jihād: Faṣl Aqall al-Jihād marra fī Kull ʿĀm)
Suppose, for instance, that a military campaign is likely to result in defeat, the killing of Muslims, the destruction of Muslim property, and the destruction of beneficial treaties and political relations with non-Muslims. Suppose this military campaign will also cause non-Muslims to institute repressive laws against Muslim minorities and spread propaganda which stigmatizes Islamic teachings. If a military campaign will only produce these consequences, then it should not be launched.
Put differently, Muslims should not wage jihād recklessly, with no consideration of the consequences. Waging jihād in this manner was not the way of the Prophet ﷺ, the Companions, or later Muslim leaders throughout history.
These principles are exemplified in the early Muslim community, led by the Prophet ﷺ.
In Makka, the Muslims were violently persecuted by the Quraysh, but the Muslims did not have adequate resources to fight. If they would have risen against the Quraysh, it would have likely resulted in their slaughter.
This being the case, the Muslims patiently endured persecution from the Quraysh or fled (e.g., to Abyssinia). Meanwhile Muslims slowly increased their strength by migrating to Madina (hijra) and making various treaty alliances (e.g., with Jews and certain polytheist tribes). After that, they engaged in raids on the Quraysh (like Badr), and also signed peace treaties (like Hudaybiya). When the number of Muslims was large enough, they marched on Makka and conquered the city with minimal casualties. The decision to march on Makka was not taken until the likely outcome was a safe victory rather than defeat and slaughter.
Any Muslim who wages jihād recklessly has done something blameworthy and cannot claim that his actions are justified by Islam or the example of the Prophet ﷺ. For example, suppose that the present leader of Muslim Pakistan decided to recklessly launch missiles at India, knowing that this would invite a nuclear retaliation that would wipe out all Pakistanis. Such a war would be blameworthy from an Islamic standpoint.
Islamic legal doctrine (fiqh) on jihād differs in significant ways from legal doctrine on other matters – such as prayer, fasting, eating, sexual intercourse and so on. For instance, a Muslim simply prays the five daily prayers without considering the consequences of doing so. He fasts Ramadan without considering the consequences of doing so. He refrains from eating pork or engaging in fornication without considering the consequences of doing so. To the extent that consequences are considered, this is only in exceptional circumstances (e.g., can one eat pork to survive on a desert island – see e.g., Quran 2:173). But when it comes to waging war, consequences always merit serious consideration.
Second Principle: Jihād must be waged in a manner which shows due respect to the lives of non-Muslims
Islam accords value to the lives of all creatures. For instance, Islam accords values to the life of animals. Consider the following hadith report:
The Prophet (ﷺ) said, “A man felt very thirsty while he was on the way, there he came across a well. He went down the well, quenched his thirst and came out. Meanwhile he saw a dog panting and licking mud because of excessive thirst. He said to himself, “This dog is suffering from thirst as I did.” So, he went down the well again and filled his shoe with water and watered it. Allah thanked him for that deed and forgave him. The people said, “O Allah’s Messenger (ﷺ)! Is there a reward for us in serving the animals?” He replied: “Yes, there is a reward for serving any animate (living being).” Saḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Kitāb al-Mazālim[2]
Because Islam respects the life of animals it is forbidden to harm them or kill them without adequate justification. For instance, animals may not be killed for target practice.[3] It is permissible to kill animals for food, but this must be done in a humane way – quickly with a sharp knife to prevent suffering.[4]
Islam accords even higher value to human life. This is reflected in Quranic story of Habil/Abel and Qabil/Cain ([Quran 5:27-32]), which condemns the unjustified shedding of human blood. The story includes the following verse
“We decreed to the Children of Israel that if anyone kills a person- unless in retribution for murder or spreading corruption in the land- it is as if he kills all mankind, while if any saves a life it is as if he saves the lives of all mankind.” Quran 5:32
Reflecting these ideas, medieval books on the Islamic law assert that one of the highest goals of the Sharīʿa (Maqāsid al-Sharīʿa) is to protect human life (ḥifz al-nafs).
Needless to say, the lives of Muslims have value. However, the lives of non-Muslims also have value. Hence, they can only be taken if there is a justification and need to do so.
One important work on this subject is treatise by the famous thirteenth century scholar Ibn Taymiyya. The treatise is titled: “Summary of Principles with respect to Fighting the Disbelievers and Making Treaties with them, and the Prohibition on Killing Disbelievers simply due to their Disbelief.”[5] In the work, Ibn Taymiyya explains how the general body of Muslim scholars holds that non-Muslims cannot be killed simply due to their disbelief. Rather, there must be some justification for taking their lives.
Based on this principle, in jihād there are Sharīʿa rules which prohibit the intentional killing of non-Muslim women, children, the elderly, monks, and so on.[6] These people pose no military threat. Hence there is no justification for taking their lives.
Jihād rules of this kind are based on the clear example of the Prophet ﷺ and the earliest Muslims.
For example, in one hadith, it is stated that
“[A] woman was found killed in one of these battles; so the Messenger of God (ﷺ) forbade the killing of women and children.” Saḥīḥ Muslim, Kitāb al-Jihād wa al-Siyar[7]
The first Caliph Abū Bakr gave the following command to his armies:
“Do not kill women or children or an aged, infirm person. Do not cut down fruit-bearing trees. Do not destroy an inhabited place. Do not slaughter sheep or camels except for food. Do not burn bees and do not scatter them. Do not steal from the booty, and do not be cowardly.” Mālik, al-Muwaṭṭa, Kitāb al-Jihād[8]
Every society in history has permitted the killing of enemy adult males because they pose a military threat. Islam takes the same position. Or, to be more precise. Islam holds that the lives of adult enemy males have value. But these lives can be taken because there is a justification for doing so.
This is similar to the cases of the non-Muslim female soldier and the Muslim murderer. Unlike the ordinary non-Muslim female, the female who is fighting as a soldier may be killed because she poses a threat. This justifies taking her life despite its inherent value. Likewise, the life a Muslim murderer has value. But it is justified to take his life in order to punish him for his crime and to deter others from committing the same crime.
Third Principle: Jihād campaigns are the responsibility of the political ruler, and may not be waged by random individuals.
The first and second principles are tied to the third principle; namely, the need for a political ruler to wage proper jihād.
Consider how the first principle, concerning consequences, is tied to the third principle
Because jihād doctrine is concerned with consequences, it is also concerned with political authority. One cannot wage war successfully, with positive consequences, without political authority. Political authority is essential for ensuring careful planning and cooperation – things needed for wars, just as they are needed for applying laws.
To wage a successful war, it is necessary to gather resources through taxation. These taxes must be used to pay soldiers and provide them with adequate training and weapons. Intelligence must be gathered on enemies – on their strengths and weaknesses. It is also necessary to engage in diplomacy and make alliance treaties – for alliances are essential to winning any war. Political authorities consider all of the relevant information – about the enemies’ strengths and weaknesses, about what alliances are possible – and then they make a decision on whether it is possible to wage a successful war.
This is exactly what the Prophet ﷺ did. The Prophet ﷺ gathered the necessary resources. He sent his companions to gather intelligence. He decided whether and when to launch military campaigns depending upon the strength of the enemy. He formed the necessary alliances to win his wars. The Companions waged wars in keeping with the same principles, as did Muslim leaders throughout history.
Traditional fiqh texts emphasize the preceding points. Thus, they assert that waging jihād requires careful planning and cooperation, and hence it must be managed by a political authority (imām).
Ibn Taymiyya states:
It is necessary to know that establishing political rule over people is one of the most important religious duties. Without it, matters related to this world and the next cannot be performed. Humans cannot realize their interests without coming together, because they need one another. When they come together they require an authority. Hence, the Prophet ﷺ said: “If three individuals go out to travel, one of them should be appointed as head…. And the Prophet ﷺ said: “It is not permissible for three individuals to be in the wilderness, without appointing one of them as their head.” The fact that it is necessary to appoint a person to lead a small temporary group when travelling indicates that the same should be done for all types of groups. God has obligated us to enjoin the good and forbid the evil, and that cannot be accomplished without power and authority. And the like is true of all that God has commanded with respect to jihād; to establishing justice; to undertaking Hajj, Friday prayer and the Eid festivals; to aiding the oppressed; and to implementing hudud punishments. These things cannot be accomplished without power (quwwa) and authority (imāra). For that reason it is narrated that: “The political authority (sulṭān) is God’s shadow on earth” and it is said: “sixty years under an unjust ruler is better than one night without a political authority”. And experience proves this is the case.
Ibn Taymiyya, Majmū’ al-Fatāwā, “Al-Siyāsa al-Shar’iyya fī Iṣlāḥ al-Rā’ī wa al-Ra’iyya: Faṣl Wilāya Amr al-Nās min A’azam Wājibāt al-Dīn” [9]
Traditional fiqh works state over and over again that jihād is the responsibility not of the political authority – not random individuals.
For example, Ibn Qudāma states:
“The matter of jihād is delegated to the political authority (mawkūl ilā al-imām) and his judgement. His subjects are obligated to obey him in what he decides.”
Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, Kitāb al-Jihād: Faṣl wa Amr al-Jihād Mawkūl ilā al-Imām wa Ijtihādihi[10]
Likewise, al-Buhūtī states:
“It is not permissible to fight without the permission of the amīr (ruler or military leader) because he is more knowledgeable in matters of war and the matter is delegated to him”
Al-Buhuti, Kashshāf al-Qinā’ ‘an Matn al-Iqnā’, Kitāb al-Jihād Fasl: Yalzam al-Jaysh Tā’a al-Amīr[11]
Al-Qurṭubī, in his well-known Tafsīr, states:
“raiding parties do not go forth without the permission of the political ruler, so that he can gather intelligence for them, and support them from behind, and perhaps they need him to repel [dangers from them]”
Al-Qurṭubī, Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī, Exegesis of Quran 4:71[12]
Significantly, the same views are repeated by conservative Muslim scholars living today.
Thus, Saudi Arabia’s Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Iftā’ has stated:
Jihād to make the word of God supreme, to protect the religion of Islam, to make possible its spread, and to protect its sanctity – that is a duty for everyone who is able. But it is essential that soldiers be organized and sent out in an orderly fashion, lest it lead to chaos and incidents that bring unfortunate consequences. Hence initiation of jihād is the responsibility of the ruler of the Muslims, and the scholars must encourage him.[13]
The major Saudi authority Ibn ‘Uthaymīn (d.2001), expresses the same opinion – emphasizing that the political authority is responsible for managing jihād and no one may fight without his permission.
Ibn ‘Uthaymīn states:
It is not permissible for the army to set out on a campaign without the permission of the ruler, no matter what the situation, because the ones to whom the command to fight and engage in jihād is addressed are the rulers, not individuals. Individuals have to follow the decision-makers. So it is not permissible for anyone to fight without the permission of the ruler, except in the case of defense. If the enemy attacks them suddenly and they are afraid of his evil, then they may defend themselves, because fighting becomes an individual obligation in that case.
The reason why that is not permitted is because the matter of jihād is the ruler’s responsibility, and fighting without his permission is a transgression against his rights and over stepping the mark. If it were permissible for the people to fight without the permission of the ruler, that would lead to chaos. Everyone who wanted to would mount his horse and go fight, and if the people were allowed to do that it would lead to many negative consequences. Some people would equip themselves on the grounds that they want to fight the enemy but their real aim would be to rebel against the ruler, or to spread evil by attacking another group of people, as God says: “And if two parties (or groups) among the believers fall to fighting, then make peace between them both” [Quran 49:9] For these three reasons and others it is not permissible to fight without the permission of the ruler.”[14]
But there is not only a relationship between the first principle concerning consequences and the third principle concerning the need for political authority.
There is also a relationship between the second principle concerning the value of non-Muslim life, and the third principle concerning the need for political authority.
The political authority is responsible for implementing Sharīʿa rules, and punishing those who break these rules. Sharīʿa must be applied in all areas, including jihād warfare. Hence, the ruler must ensure that those who wage jihād do not violate these rules and commit prohibited actions against non-Muslims – like rape or killing women and children. Where the ruler does not enforce these rules, and maintain a disciplined army, countless atrocities which violate Sharīʿa are likely to occur.
The notion that the pollical ruler must enforce Sharīʿa rules in jihād comes from the Prophet ﷺ and the early Muslims like Abū Bakr. Remember that these figures monitored the Muslim armies and commanded them not to kill women, children, the elderly, and the like. In fact, the Prophet ﷺ set an especially good example of humaneness in war through amnesty, like the mass amnesty he granted his bitter enemies from the Quraysh upon conquering Makka.
Now that we have examined the three general principles of jihād, we can say clarify some important issues. When Muslims talk about jihād warfare, what they mean is warfare conducted in keeping with all three principles.
What they mean is that Muslim political authorities set up a proper military with adequate resources, training, intelligence, and alliances. These authorities come up with war plans that have beneficial consequences for Islam and Muslims. The authorities also maintain discipline in the army, and ensure that soldiers do not commit atrocities reflecting a lack of respect for non-Muslim life.
Recall that advocacy of applying Sharīʿa does not mean that random individuals take it upon themselves to impose punishments. Similarly, advocacy of jihād does not mean that random individuals take it upon themselves to declare war, launching attacks on others. After all, such warfare would tend to end in disaster. The individuals who declared the war might not have the resources to win it. Moreover, they might declare war on allies of the Muslim government, or they might declare war on enemies that the Muslim government is not capable of defeating – inviting disastrous retaliation. Random individuals might also declare war on the Muslim government itself, thereby sparking a bloody civil war (fitna) that results in massive destruction and loss of life. Random individuals might not only undertake actions which result in numerous Muslim deaths. They might also embrace tactics that result in the indiscriminate slaughter of non-Muslims in ways that violate Sharīʿa rules on jihād. We will return to this matter shortly when we consider the tactics associated with terrorist groups.
Significantly, premodern religious scholars note that there is a parallel between jihād and the implementation of Sharīʿa punishments. Scholars explain that duties to wage jihād and implement punishments are the responsibility of the Muslim community as a whole (Farḍ kifāya), and they are to be undertaken by the political authority who manages the affairs of the community as a whole. Such duties are not meant to be undertaken by random individuals.
Ibn Taymiyya writes:
God addressed the [general body of] believers concerning the ḥudūd punishments and legal duties in an unqualified fashion, as in His statement [Quran 5:38]: “Amputate [the hands] of the male and female thief”, and His statement [Quran 24:4]: “Those who slander chaste women then do not bring four witnesses, flog them”, and His statement [Quran 24:4]: “and never accept their testimony in the future”. But it is known that in reality [God is not addressing all believers. Rather He is only] addressing the one who has the power to perform [what is commanded] and those who lack the power are not obligated [to perform what is commanded]. It is known that this is a collective obligation (farḍ ‘alā al-kifāya), and it is like jihād. Indeed, it is a type of jihād. [Consider God’s] statement [Quran 2:216]: “You are obligated to fight” and His statement [Quran 2:190] “Fight in the path of God”, and His statement [Quran 9:39] “If you do not march forth He will punish you”. Commands like this are a collective obligation to be undertaken by those with the power [to perform it] – and the power is political authority (sulṭān). For that reason, the implementation of the hudud punishments is obligatory upon the political authority and his representatives.
Ibn Taymiyya, Majmū’ al-Fatāwā, “Kitāb al-Ḥudūd” [15]
Application of Jihād Principles: Are random Muslim individuals entitled to declare war on others?
In premodern fiqh texts, the general jihād principles enunciated above are used to answer very specific questions. Here we will consider two of the most important.
1. May a random Muslim individual living in a non-Muslim country (Dār al-Ḥarb) declare war on his non-Muslim neighbors?
Suppose there is a Muslim merchant, student, or tourist living among non-Muslims. Can he harm them by stealing from them or attacking them – for example, detonating a bomb in a church or at an Arianna Grande concert (e.g., the 2017 Manchester arena bombing)?
Fiqh texts say this is forbidden. This is based on the concept of amān.[3] An amān is an agreement not to harm others by killing them or taking their property. When a Muslim enters into a land ruled by non-Muslims, they tacitly or explicitly agree not to harm the Muslim visitor. And the Muslim is only permitted to enter based on his tacit or explicit agreement not to harm non-Muslims. In short, the non-Muslims and the Muslim visitor make an agreement not to harm each other. This type of agreement was standard in the premodern period and is what allowed Muslims to visit or reside in non-Muslim lands. Fiqh texts hold that when a Muslim makes an agreement not to harm non-Muslims, he must adhere to it. He cannot simply declare a jihād and start killing those around him.
In his famous fiqh text Kitāb al-Umm, al-Shāfiʿī states:
If some Muslims enter into the lands of non-Muslims with an amān, then the enemy non-Muslims are to be made safe until the Muslims leave – or until the validity of the amān expires – and the Muslims may not wrong the non-Muslims or betray them.
Al-Shāfiʿī, Kitāb al-Umm, Kitāb al-Ḥukm fī Qitāl al-Mushrikin wa Masʾala Māl al-Ḥarbī: Bāb Al-Mustaʾmin fī Dār al-Ḥarb
In his influential fiqh text al-Hidāya, Marghīnānī states:
If a Muslim enters the land of non-Muslims as a merchant he is not permitted to harm their property or bodies because he guaranteed that he would not harm them when he requested the amān. Harming them after that would be betrayal – and betrayal is forbidden.
Al-Marghīnānī, Al-Hidāya, Kitāb al-Siyar: Bāb al-Mustaʾmin
2. May a random Muslim individual living in a Muslim country declare war on his non-Muslim neighbors?
In a Muslim land, an individual Muslim is required to obey the Muslim ruler and his laws. The laws of the ruler, based on the Sharīʿa, generally do not permit any individual to simply start killing others – whether Muslim or non-Muslim. The non-Muslim is technically classed as a dhimmī, which means a protected non-Muslim who pays tribute (jizya). Killing such a non-Muslim is considered murder, which merits qiṣāṣ punishment and/or ta’zir punishment. A random individual cannot give himself the right to murder his Muslim and non-Muslim neighbors simply by declaring a jihād against them.
The rights of dhimmīs are mentioned in various hadiths, which address the protections that dhimmīs are to receive, due to their treatises with Muslims.
Thus, in one hadith, the Prophet ﷺ says:
“Whoever killed a person having a treaty with the Muslims, shall not smell the smell of Paradise – although its smell is perceived from a distance of forty years.”
Saḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Kitāb al-Jizya wa al-Muwāda’a[16]
Islamic texts also frequently attribute some variant of the following statement to the Prophet ﷺ (even though its authenticity is debated).
“Whoever harms a dhimmi I shall be his foe on the Day of Judgment.”[17]
Furthermore, as a general principle, the random individual Muslim is not entitled to declare jihād war on the Muslim ruler and rise against him in rebellion. This is impermissible khurūj, and is condemned in many hadiths and fiqh texts.
We entered upon ‘Ubada bin As-Samit while he was sick. We said, “May Allah make you healthy. Will you tell us a Hadith you heard from the Prophet ﷺ and by which Allah may make you benefit?”
He said, “The Prophet ﷺ called us and we gave him the Pledge of allegiance for Islam, and among the conditions on which he took the Pledge from us, was that we were to listen and obey (the orders) both at the time when we were active and at the time when we were tired, and at our difficult time and at our ease and to be obedient to the ruler and give him his right even if he did not give us our right, and not to fight against him unless we noticed him having open Kufr (disbelief) for which we would have a proof with us from Allah.”
Saḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Kitāb al-Fitan[18]
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There is nothing at all odd in such rules. There have been many empires throughout history which have endorsed imperial conquest (e.g., Romans, Chinese, French, British). But these empires did not permit their subjects to randomly declare war on their neighbors and start killing them. These empires also did not encourage random individuals to declare war and attack others beyond their borders.
Rather, such empires held that war and conquest were to be planned out and supervised by state authorities. For instance, the British empire believed in conquering other lands. But it did not did not encourage random British people to travel into lands (e.g., India, China) and then attack people there (e.g., bomb a Hindu temple in India).
Muslim empires had policies similar to other past empires. Accordingly, they did endorse warfare and conquest through jihād. However, this did not involve having random Muslim travelers in non-Muslim lands start killing those around them or attacking their houses of worship (e.g., having a Muslim merchant in the Byzantine empire stab his Christian neighbor, or stab people at worship in the nearby Christian church).
Admittedly, in some cases, empires – both Muslim and non-Muslim – authorized private individuals (e.g., privateers, corsairs) to attack enemy populations in a war. Empires compensated these individuals for their efforts by permitting them to take booty from the enemy populations. Hence, the individuals usually focused their attacks on enemy ships and caravans – enriching themselves with booty while weakening the enemy economically. But once again, such attacks were permitted and overseen by state authorities as part of a state war policy.
Notably, there is precedent for such tactics from the life of the Prophet ﷺ. Thus, during the conflict between the Muslims in Madina, and the Quraysh in Makka, the Prophet ﷺ encouraged a small group of Muslims living outside of Madina (e.g., Abū Baṣīr, Abū Jandal) to attack the Quraysh. The group raided their caravans for booty.[19] This was part of the Prophet’s ﷺ overall war strategy which led to the economic crippling of the Quraysh and their peaceful surrender soon after. Needless to say, if the Prophet ﷺ believed that his war strategy would be better served by stopping such raids, he could have ordered their stoppage, and the raiding group would have been obliged to follow the command.
Are there exceptional situations where individuals can wage war without the permission of the ruler?
Now, that we have covered some basic jihād rules, it is possible to consider some more complex and technical issues. As noted above, as a general principle jihād may only be waged by the political ruler. However, it may asked whether there are exceptional situations where individuals can wage war without the permission of the ruler? In fact premodern fiqh texts discuss two such situations. The first involves defensive jihād. The second involves Muslims living in border regions. Let us consider both cases in turn.
1. Can individuals wage war without the ruler’s permission in situations of defensive jihād?
As noted previously, premodern fiqh texts make a distinction between two basic types of jihād: offensive jihād (jihād al-ṭalab) and defensive jihād (jihād al-daf’).
Generally speaking, both types of jihād must adhere to the three principles enunciated above. Thus, in both cases, jihād may only be waged if it has beneficial consequences for Islam and Muslims; jihād must be waged with due respect for the lives of non-Muslims, and jihād must be waged under a political ruler.
However, here there is a slight nuance. Fiqh texts hold that there are certain exceptional circumstances where wars may temporally be fought without the approval of a political authority. These exceptional circumstances are usually associated with defensive jihād.
Understanding this point, requires considering the principle of ḍarūra (extreme need).
The ḍarūra principle may be explained as follows. In some circumstances, following ordinary Sharīʿa rules results in extreme danger to the life or bodily health of Muslims. In these limited circumstances, it is not required to follow Sharīʿa rules due to extreme need (i.e., the need to protect the life and health of Muslims).
Sharīʿa endorses the ḍarūra principle. It is expressed in the famous legal maxim: “Extreme need permits what is [ordinarily] prohibited” (al-ḍarūrāt tubīḥ al-maḥẓūrāt).
The ḍarūra principle is derived from the Quran.
For instance, according to the Quran, a Muslim may drink wine and eat pork if stranded on a desert island with no other nourishment.
Forbidden to you are carrion, blood, the flesh of swine…, But as for him who is forced (uḍṭurra) by severe hunger [to eat such things], with no inclination to sin, then surely God is Oft‑Forgiving, Most Merciful. Quran 5:3
Why should you not eat of that over which the name of God is mentioned, when He has expounded clearly what is forbidden to you, unless you are compelled by need (uḍṭurirtum ilayhi)? Quran 6:119
Similarly, a Muslim may deny his Islamic beliefs if his life is being threatened because of severe religious persecution.
Whoever disbelieves in God after his belief – except for one who is forced [to renounce his religion] while his heart is secure in faith. But those who [willingly] open their breasts to disbelief, upon them is wrath from God, and for them is a great punishment. Quran 16:106
Whenever ordinary Sharīʿa rules laws are lifted due to the ḍarūra principle, this is only to be done temporarily and in a carefully limited manner.
For instance, if one is starving on a desert island, one only eats pork temporarily until one finds other food. And one only eats the minimum amount of what is needed to sustain oneself. Likewise, if one makes statements publicly renouncing Islam due to religious persecution, one must stop making these statements as soon as it is safe to do so.
The ḍarūra principle only applies rarely because there are few situations where one’s life and health are threatened. For example, such threats almost never exist when one is doing ordinary Sharīʿa-related actions like praying, or fasting, or marrying, or executing commercial transactions.
However, in the case of jihād, the lives and health of Muslims are frequently threatened. Consequently, the ḍarūra principle applies more often.
We can now return to the concepts of offensive and defensive jihād. In offensive jihād, Muslims are not faced with a severe and immediate threat from others. Rather, Muslims choose to attack others at a convenient time, with the aim of conquering them. Fiqh texts hold that in such circumstances the ḍarūra principle does not apply, and Muslims must follow ordinary Sharīʿa rules. These include leaving matters of jihād to the political ruler, and not doing anything without his permission.
Fiqh texts hold that matters are different with respect to defensive jihād. Here enemy forces attack Muslims, and they often do so suddenly, while focusing on vulnerable border positions that are not well defended. Because vulnerable populations are under threat, the ḍarūra principle sometimes applies. Such people are permitted to engage in jihād warfare to defend themselves from invading enemies without first asking permission from the political authority. This is because there is no time to ask for the permission of the political authority.
On instructive premodern text on this matter is by Ibn ‘Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, where he recounts the views of various legal authorities from the Maliki school.
Saḥnūn said, on authority of ‘Ibn Nāfi`, on authority of Mālik – and it is in al-`Utbiyyah – from the audience of ‘Ash’hab, regarding the enemy landing on the coastline of the Muslims:
Should they fight without permission from the political ruler (Imām)?
He said: “If [the political ruler] is close to them, they should seek his permission. If he is far away, they should fight [the disbelievers] and not leave them alone until [the ruler with the Muslim army] rushes to them.
Ibn ‘Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, An-Nawādir wa-l-Ziyādāt, Al-Juz al-Awwal min al-Jihād: Fī al-Ghazw bi Ghayr Idhn al-Imām. [20]
Similarly, al-Buhūtī (from the Hanbali school) states:
It is not permissible to fight without the permission of the amīr (ruler or military leader)…except if the enemy surprises them [with an attack] – coming upon them suddenly…because need requires [immediate fighting without permission] due to the harm caused by delaying it.
Al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-Qinā’ ‘an Matn al-Iqnā’, Kitāb al-Jihād Fasl: Yalzam al-Jaysh Tā’a al-Amīr[21]
To sum up. Here we have a situation where Muslim individuals are suddenly attacked by non-Muslims. This triggers defensive jihād. If the ruler is in the area, he immediately takes control of the situation, and no one may fight without his permission. On the other hand, if the ruler is far away, and it will take time to get his permission, then individuals are temporarily allowed to fight in order to defend themselves, in keeping with the ḍarūra principle. However, as soon as the political ruler arrives, he takes control of the situation, and further fighting requires his permission.
All of this is consistent with the example of the Prophet ﷺ, and with reason. Thus, the Prophet ﷺ was the political ruler of Madina. When non-Muslim armies attacked Madina (e.g., Uḥud, Khandaq) he exercised control over the situation. Individual Muslims in Madina did not launch counterattacks without the Prophet’s permission. Rather, they followed his commands. For example, he commanded some to stay back and guard particular areas, he ordered others to stand on a hill and fight as archers, he ordered others to dig a trench, and so on.
Muslim governments throughout history, and until today, have applied the same policies. For example, if a Muslim country (like Pakistan) is attacked by non-Muslims (e.g., from India) the Muslim soldiers must still follow their ruler and his generals. This is natural because all successful warfare (including defensive jihād) requires planning and management by an authority.
2. Can individuals in border areas wage jihād without the ruler’s permission?
A controversial issue in premodern fiqh texts concerns a situation where the Muslims are at war with a neighboring non-Muslim state (i.e., it is Dār al-Ḥarb). Here there are Muslims (often soldiers) living on the borders near the non-Muslim state. If the Muslims find a good opportunity to attack the non-Muslims, may they take it without asking the political ruler’s permission?
If the political ruler (imām) has already prohibited the Muslims on the border from carrying out attacks, they may not attack. He might do this because he is in the process of negotiating a peace treaty with the non-Muslims. He might also do this because if the non-Muslims are attacked they might launch a counterattack for which the ruler is not prepared.
But what if the political ruler has chosen not to prohibit the Muslims on the border from carrying out attacks? He might do this as part of his war strategy. For example, he might want to leave the option open for Muslims on the border to attack if they see a good opportunity to do so.
It is in this very specific situation there is a disagreement among the religious scholars. Here there are two basic positions.
First, the Muslims may not attack without the permission of the political ruler. However, some acknowledge a temporary exception if a good opportunity to attack presents itself, and there is no time to consult with the political ruler.
Second, the Muslims may attack without the permission of the ruler, because they are targeting non-Muslims who are at war with the Muslims. At the same time, it is disputed whether such attacks count as jihād, because jihād ordinarily requires the endorsement of the political ruler.
We see these two positions recurring in different fiqh texts.
Let us return to Ibn ‘Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī’s text, where he recounts the views of various legal authorities from the Maliki school.
From the book of ‘Ibn al-Mawwāz: Can a person launch attacks without permission from the political ruler (Imām)? I [Ibn al-Mawwāz] said: As for the army and the assembly [of soldiers], then there is no departing [Dār al-Islām] for them except by permission of the ruler (Imām) and his appointing a Walī for them. An exception was made for people inhabiting regions bordering the land of disbelievers [Ahl al-Thaghūr] among those who are close to the enemy when they find an opportunity [to attack disbelievers] and [obtaining] the ruler’s permission [requires travelling] a far distance.
Mālik facilitated [accepting that opinion]. As for a war party departing from the army, then that would not be permissible for them…Muḥammad said: That would only be permissible for those who are far from the ruler, like a day’s [journey], and they find an opportunity [to attack the disbelievers].
Ibn ‘Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, An-Nawādir wa-l-Ziyādāt, Al-Juz al-Awwal min al-Jihād: Fī al-Ghazw bi Ghayr Idhn al-Imām.[22]
The Maliki scholars above endorse the first position. The Hanbali al-Buhūtī affirms the same view inKashshāf al-Qinā’ ‘an Matn al-Iqnā’, Kitāb al-Jihād Fasl: Yalzam al-Jaysh Tā’a al-Amīr.[23]
The second position is characteristic of Hanafi scholars, e.g., Al-Qudūri’s Kitāb al-Tajrīd: Kitāb al-Siyar: Mas’ala dukhūl al-‘adad alladhī la man’a lahu fī Dār al-Ḥarb[24]as also cited in Ibn Qudāma’s al-Mughnī, Kitāb al-Jihād: Faṣl Dakhl Qawm lā manʿa lahum Dār al-Ḥarb bi-Ghayr Idhn al-Imām fa Ghanimū.[25]
In modern times, some have sought to support the second position (or something close to it) by citing an incident from the life of the Prophet ﷺ. Recall that during the conflict between the Muslims in Madina, and the Quraysh in Makka, the Prophet ﷺ encouraged a small group of Muslims living outside of Madina (e.g., Abū Baṣīr, Abū Jandal) to attack the Quraysh. The group raided their caravans for booty.[26] This group operated with a great deal of independence. Hence it was somewhat similar to Muslims on the borderlands taking the initiative to launch attacks. Nevertheless, upon closer examination, such an analysis is problematic. In the incident from the Prophet’s ﷺ life, he clearly encourages the attacks, thereby giving permission for them before they occur. Thus, whether or not the second position is correct, it is not supported by this incident – for the second position presumes no prior permission.
To sum up, there is some difference of opinion when there are Muslims living on the border, next to a country fighting a war with the Muslims. It is agreed that the political ruler has ultimate authority in this situation. Hence, he can forbid Muslims on the border from launching attacks on non-Muslims. But in situations where he choses not to forbid these attacks, then there is disagreement among religious scholars. One group of scholars requires first getting the ruler’s permission before attacking, although some are willing to make a temporary exception if there is no time to contact the ruler. The second group of scholars allows attacks without the permission of the ruler. However, even among scholars who endorse such attacks, there are disputes about whether they really count as jihād.
To repeat, neither of the preceding positions denies that the political ruler has ultimate authority over waging jihād, even in border areas. The dispute simply concerns whether attacks may be launched without getting the ruler’s explicit permission beforehand. Were it the case that the ruler did not have ultimate authority, Muslims in border areas could simply choose to disobey the ruler and launch attacks despite his orders not to do so. For instance, the ruler could command his troops not to attack because he is negotiating a peace treaty, or because he fears doing so will provoke a disastrous counterattack, or because he needs the troops to stay back and guard certain cities. And in this case the troops could simply attack anyway regardless of the consequences.
No Muslim government in the past or in the present has ever tolerated such behavior, given its disastrous consequences. For example, contemporary Pakistan does not accept that its troops – who are stationed on the Chinese and Indian borders – have the right to disobey orders from the president and his generals, and simply start launching raids against China and India, or launching missiles at these countries. Any soldiers who did this in a Muslim (or non-Muslim) country would be immediately arrested and (probably) executed for high crimes.
Defensive Jihād in the Modern Period
Thus far, we have been focusing on jihād rules as applied in the premodern period. How do they apply in the modern period?
During the modern period, non-Muslims have frequently invaded and destroyed Muslim governments. There have also been Muslim governments overthrown from within by non-Muslim forces. In these situations, is it permissible for Muslims to launch military attacks as a form of resistance and defensive jihād?
Here we return to the three principles mentioned above.
First, jihād always requires a consideration of the consequences. Reckless jihād is blameworthy in all circumstances, even as a mode of resisting unjust non-Muslim rule. Military resistance is unacceptable if it is likely to result in nothing more than defeat and harm to Muslims – if it results in nothing but the killing of Muslims, the destruction of Muslim property, the ruining of agreements and beneficial political relations with non-Muslims, repressive laws against Muslims, and anti-Muslim propaganda.
Moreover, even if there is initially the prospect of success in winning a war of resistance, when it becomes clear that victory is impossible, the war must be ended. This was the case with many Muslims who engaged in political resistance during the colonial period – the classical example being the religious scholar ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jazā’irī and his resistance against the French during the conquest of Algeria. ‘Abd al-Qādir ended his resistance once it became clear that it was futile and that it was causing Muslim Algerians more harm than good.
Second, jihād always requires due respect for the lives of non-Muslims. Thus, simply because Muslims are fighting a defensive jihād, this does not mean that they have a license to indiscriminately slaughter non-Muslims – intentionally targeting their women, children, and the elderly.
Third, in reality, even if a Muslim land has been taken over by a non-Muslims, and the Muslim government has been overthrown, Muslim military resistance cannot succeed without political leadership, which ensures necessary planning and cooperation. There can be some level of political leadership even outside of a government. But not anyone can simply claim such leadership. Rather, the Muslim masses must actually accord such person authority and be willing to follow him. We can think of many such examples during the colonial period, like ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jazā’irī, Imam Shamil, and ‘Umar al-Mukhtār. This is, of course, very different from random individuals simply taking it up themselves to declare war and launch military attacks.
Modern Theories of Jihād
In the premodern period, Muslim states were among the most powerful in the world. There were always political rulers capable of protecting the Muslims, their lands, and their religion. Nevertheless, the modern period has seen the vast majority of Muslim countries invaded and taken over by non-Muslim powers. In the colonial period (~1800-1950), virtually every Muslim majority country was taken over by non-Muslim powers from Europe (e.g., Britain, France, the Netherlands, Russia, Italy). Moreover, since the end of the colonial period, non-Muslim powers have often exerted formal or informal control over Muslim-majority countries – making it difficult for their leaders to protect the Muslims, their lands, and their religion.
This state of affairs has had a major impact on how some Muslim religious scholars and intellectuals have thought about jihād. Influential works on this topic were penned between the 1960s and the 1980s. Here three works stand out in importance.
The first work is a book titled: “Milestones” (Maʿālim fī aṭ Ṭarīq). It was published in 1964. It was written by Sayyid Quṭb, an Egyptian religious intellectual associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. He was executed in 1966 by the Egyptian government for his political activism. Milestones asserts that Muslim governments no longer implement the Sharīʿa and protect Islam. Rather under these governments, the Muslim lands have reverted to the same condition they were in before the coming of Islam (Jāhiliyya). Muslims must struggle to correct this situation, by preaching and physical jihād. This process will be led by a small vanguard of committed Muslims. Quṭb’s work is significant for its break with premodern fiqh texts. Thus, whereas premodern texts understand jihād as the responsibility of the political ruler, Quṭb understands it as the responsibility of random committed individuals not associated with any government.
The second work is a book titled: “The Neglected Obligation” (al-Farīḍa al-Ghāʾiba), written in the late 1970s. It was authored by the Egyptian religious intellectual Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Salām Faraj. He was executed in 1982 for his role in the 1981 assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. Influenced by the ideas of Quṭb, in The Neglected Obligation, Faraj argues that random Muslim individuals are entitled to wage jihād without the backing of the government. Faraj justifies this by noting that premodern fiqh texts allow individuals to fight without the ruler’s permission in a situation of defensive jihād. He says that all Muslim lands are controlled by non-Muslims, so defensive jihād is warranted. Recall that premodern texts hold that individuals can fight defensive jihād temporarily where the ruler is far away – until he comes and takes control of the situation. Faraj reinterprets the relevant principle. For him, in situations of defensive jihād, random individuals can fight for as long as they wish even if the ruler commands them not to do so.[27] Indeed, the type of jihād envisioned by Faraj involves killing those who claim to be Muslim rulers (like Sadat). Faraj goes a step further and says that random individuals who fight should not be overly concerned with the consequences of their actions. Rather jihād is a divine command, and they should simply fulfill this command.[28] Notice that Faraj breaks with premodern fiqh texts in two ways. In addition to making jihād the responsibility of random individuals, he asserts that consideration of the consequences is not essential.
The third work is a booklet titled: “Defense of Muslim Lands: The Most Important Obligation on Individual Muslims” (Difāʿ ‘an Arāḍī al-Muslimīn: Ahamm Furūḍ al-A’yān).[29] It was written around 1980 by the religious scholar ‘Abdullah Azzām. Azzām was a Palestinian Azhar PhD who died in 1989 fighting in Afghanistan. He was greatly admired by other militants in Afghanistan, and was the direct teacher and mentor of al-Qaeda-founder Usāma bin Lādin. Azzām was influenced by Quṭb, and his message is similar to that of Faraj. He holds that in situations of defensive jihād random individuals can fight for as long as they wish. They do not need permission from the ruler, and it is not the right of rulers to control the jihād. Azzām also insisted that random individual Muslims should travel around the world declaring war on the enemies of Muslims – starting with Afghanistan and Palestine.
Milestones, The Neglected Obligation, and Defense of Muslim Lands, became central texts for the Muslim terrorist groups that began to emerge in the 1980s – including al-Qaeda and later ISIS. As noted above, these texts rejected standard jihād principles found in premodern texts, like the principle of considering consequences and the principle of political authority. Moreover, as we will see, many terrorist groups adopted tactics involving the indiscriminate slaughter of non-Muslims. This is not surprising because there was no political authority to impose discipline on them, and hold them to relevant Sharīʿa rules. In this way, all three of the premodern jihād principles would be violated.
Terrorism
We are now in a position to speak with more precision about terrorism. In reality, terrorism is a very vague term which is often used in an inconsistent manner. Powerful Western countries label violence they do not support as terrorism (e.g., Muslim resistance in Palestine or Iraq). Meanwhile, they label similar violence which they do support as legitimate rebellion (e.g., the American revolution, Anti-Russian resistance in Ukraine). This is one reason why many scholars reject the term terrorism altogether as meaningless and politically biased.
Nevertheless, other scholars note that the term terrorism can be defined more narrowly and used more consistently. Such scholars define terrorism as political violence carried out by non-state actors – by individuals who are not political authorities. This paper will us the preceding definition.
Due to a combination of ignorance and anti-Muslim propaganda, many individuals equate jihād with terrorism – including forms of terrorism which are extremely reckless, and which involve the indiscriminate slaughter of non-Muslims. Anti-Muslim propaganda cites Quranic verses out of context to support this view. The most popular verse cited is “kill polytheists wherever you find them” (Quran 9:5).
It is claimed that Muslims understand this verse to mean that random individual Muslims should kill polytheists and non-Muslims wherever they are found – whether in Muslim lands or non-Muslims lands. On this view, random Muslim individuals should unleash a bloody free-for-all where they “declare war” on all Christians, or all Jews, or all Hindus, or all Buddhists – blowing them up, running over them with trucks, and stabbing them to death wherever they are found. Moreover, all of this is supposed to be done in a reckless manner without consideration of the consequences, and without any respect for the lives of non-Muslims. Muslims should simply kill infidels, even if it accomplishes no valid political goals and only brings harm to Muslims, to the reputation of Islam, and to non-Muslims. As explained above, this is a complete and total misrepresentation of Islamic legal doctrine on jihād.
We now come to modern terrorist groups associated with Islam, including al-Qaeda and ISIS. These two groups have dominated the headlines for the past 20 years. Their actions have been used to justify wars and police repression against Muslims throughout the world – resulting in literally 2 to 4 million Muslim deaths and around 40 million Muslim refugees.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS have long complex histories. Moreover, countless terrorist attacks have been attributed to them by the news media – although oftentimes there are doubts about whether such attributions are correct.
However, let us assume for the sake of argument that these attacks may in fact be attributed to them. If this is the case, then their acts of terrorism are highly blameworthy and not consistent with Islamic doctrine on jihād.
Notable attacks attributed to al-Qaeda include:
The 2001 9/11 attacks on New York’s world trade center, which resulted in 2,996 deaths.
The 2002 bombing of synagogue in Tunisia, which resulted in 20 deaths.
The 2002 bombing of nightclubs in Bali, which resulted in 204 deaths.
The 2003 bombing of restaurants and a hotel in Casblanca, which resulted in 45 deaths.
The 2005 bombing of the London transit system, which resulted in 56 deaths.
And many more attacks could be listed.
Notable attacks attributed to ISIS include:
The 2015 bombing of Metrojet passenger flight 9268 in Egypt, resulting in 224 deaths.
The 2015 San Bernadino, US shooting attack 2015 San Bernardino attack at a public services center, resulting in 16 deaths.
The 2015 Suicide bombings of two Shi’a mosques in Sana’a Yemen, resulting in 142 deaths.
The 2015 Suicide bombing of a Shi’a mosque in Kuwait City, resulting in 27 deaths.
The 2015 Paris shooting attacks, which killed 137 people, including 90 at the Bataclan theatre
The 2017 Manchester arena bombing in the UK, which resulted in 23 deaths.
The 2019 ISIS terrorist bombing of 3 churches in and 3 luxury hotels in Buddhist Sri Lanka – leading to 269 Christian and Buddhist deaths.
The 2021 Auckland New Zealand supermarket stabbing, which resulted in one death.
The 2022 Peshawar, Pakistan Shia mosque bombing, resulting in 63 deaths.
And many more attacks could be listed.
Let us begin with the issue of political authority. None of al-Qaeda’s attacks were sanctioned by political authorities. The case of ISIS is slightly more complex. ISIS temporarily established loose control over some territory in Syria and Iraq between 2013 and 2019. However, the rudimentary ISIS government quickly collapsed, and many ISIS attacks have been carried out since this collapse, with no political authority. Moreover, even if there were political authorities permitting the al-Qaeda and ISIS attacks, such attacks are still religiously blameworthy because they are reckless in the extreme. They accomplish no valid jihād related goal. They do not function to protect the lives and property of Muslims. They do not function to preserve or spread Islam. On the contrary, they have caused millions of Muslim deaths and tens of millions of refugees. Not only have these attacks encouraged non-Muslim wars against Muslims, they have sparked bloody civil wars in Muslim countries. These terrorist acts have stigmatized the Islamic message, and provided justification for secular regimes throughout the Muslim world to restrict and repress Islamic teaching and practice. Aside from this, many terrorist attacks have involved the indiscriminate slaughter of non-Muslims – to the point that many people now falsely believe that jihād centers on bombing churches and mass shooting people at concerts – killing countless innocent people – many of them women and children.
In fact, it is difficult to imagine any actions which could have harmed Islam and Muslims more than the actions of these terrorist groups. There is no doubt that enemies of Islam have used the actions of these groups to legitimate their attacks on Muslims. Furthermore, there are serious grounds to believe that many of the terrorist attacks have actually been planned or facilitated by military and intelligence agencies – like GIA terrorism in Algeria, the Russian apartment bombings, and the Amerithrax attacks. But because this matter deserves its own separate essay, it will not be discussed here.
Even assuming that al-Qaeda and ISIS are in fact run by sincere Muslims and that they are responsible for all of the attacks attributed to them – these terrorist acts are blameworthy and not consistent with traditional jihād doctrine. Islam condemns al-Qaeda and ISIS in the same way that it would condemn a reckless Pakistani nuclear weapons launch targeting India.
RELATED: Did Islam Spread by the Sword?
Conclusion
Jihād is one thing, and al-Qaeda or ISIS terrorism is a very different thing. Governments hostile to Islam, like the US, France, Israel, and India, and their media machines have sought to confuse the world on this point through nonstop propaganda. In their (justified) efforts to distance themselves from terrorist groups, some Muslims have also incorrectly repudiated the concept of jihād in whole or in part (e.g., some retain the concept of defensive jihād but still jettison the doctrine of offensive jihād). This is distortion of dīn. We must teach the correct doctrine of jihād while simultaneously repudiating the un-Islamic and criminal behavior of terrorist groups.
One Last Thought…
Let us end with a thought experiment. Terrorism is an effective tool for destroying religious or political movements.
How could opponents of Zionism destroy Zionism?
One unethical, evil, highly criminal possibility would be to secretly create and fund “extremist” Zionist terror groups and then have them randomly bomb synagogues, churches, and Western army bases across the world. This would have the effect of turning ordinary Jews, Christians, and powerful Western governments into intense opponents of Zionism. It would also have the effect of mobilizing their support for military operations against Zionist groups and governments.
How could opponents of Hindutva destroy Hindutva?
One unethical, evil, highly criminal possibility would be to secretly create and fund “extremist” Hindutva terror groups, and then have them randomly bomb Hindu temples, Christian churches, and Western army bases across the world. This would have the effect of turning ordinary Hindus, Christians, and powerful Western governments into intense opponents of Hindutva. It would also have the effect of mobilizing their support for military operations against Hindtuva groups and governments.
So then answer this…
How could opponents of Islamism (e.g., CIA, Mossad, liberal Arab dictators) destroy Islamism?
Connect the dots.
(Hint: The blueprint is provided by intelligence agencies’ use of false flag GIA Salafist terrorism to suppress popular Algerian Islamist movements in the 1990s and early 2000s – right before 9/11).
Notes
- https://sunnah.com/muslim/1/84 ↑
- https://sunnah.com/bukhari:2466↑
- https://www.islamweb.net/ar/library/content/0/3091/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AB%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AB%D9%85%D8%A9?idfrom=5298&idto=5301&start=1↑
- https://sunnah.com/muslim:1955a↑
- Ibn Taymiyya, Qā’ida mukhtaṣara fī Qitāl al-Kuffār wa Muhādanatihim wa Taḥrīm Qatlihim li-Mujarrad Kufrihim ↑
- See Ibn Rushd, Bidāya al-Mujtahid, Kitāb al-Jihād: Al-Faṣl al Thālith fī Ma’rifa mā yajūz min al-nikāya bi-l-‘aduww.https://shamela.ws/book/21739/392#p1Also see Ibn Taymiyya, Qā’ida mukhtaṣara fī Qitāl al-Kuffār wa Muhādanatihim wa Taḥrīm Qatlihim li-Mujarrad Kufrihim. ↑
- https://sunnah.com/muslim/32/29-35 ↑
- https://sunnah.com/urn/509710 ↑
- مجموع فتاوى ابن تيمية » الفقه » الجهاد » السياسة الشرعية في إصلاح الراعي والرعية » فصل ولاية أمر الناس من أعظم واجبات الدين https://www.islamweb.net/ar/library/content/22/2390/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%B8%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86?idfrom=3719&idto=3720&start=0 ↑
- https://shamela.ws/book/8463/4116 ↑
- https://www.islamweb.net/ar/library/content/16/213/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1?idfrom=2939&idto=2960&start=12↑
- https://quran.com/en/4:71/tafsirs/ar-tafseer-al-qurtubi↑
- https://islamqa.info/ar/answers/69746/%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D8%B0%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87 ↑
- https://islamqa.info/ar/answers/69746/%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D8%B0%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87 ↑
- https://www.islamweb.net/ar/library/index.php?page=bookcontents&idfrom=5971&idto=6070&bk_no=22&ID=3574↑
- https://sunnah.com/bukhari:3166↑
- See Ahmed El-Wakil, “Whoever Harms a Dhimmī I Shall Be His Foe on the Day of Judgment”: An Investigation into an Authentic Prophetic Tradition and Its Origins from the Covenants. Religions. 2019; 10(9):516. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10090516 ↑
- https://sunnah.com/bukhari:7055↑
- This event is reported in a hadith in Saḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. https://sunnah.com/bukhari:2731. In his commentary on the hadith (in Fatḥ al-Bārī), Ibn Ḥajar explains the event. He makes clear that the Prophet ﷺ expressed approval and encouraged the group to engage in raiding. See https://www.islamweb.net/ar/library/index.php?page=bookcontents&ID=4967&flag=1&bk_no=52 ↑
- https://shamela.ws/book/96257/1179 ↑
- https://www.islamweb.net/ar/library/content/16/213/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1?idfrom=2939&idto=2960&start=12↑
- https://shamela.ws/book/96257/1178#p1 ↑
- https://www.islamweb.net/ar/library/content/16/213/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1?idfrom=2939&idto=2960&start=12↑
- https://shamela.ws/book/17768/5914 ↑
- https://www.islamweb.net/ar/library/index.php?page=bookcontents&ID=6638&flag=1&bk_no=15↑
- This event is reported in a hadith in Saḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. https://sunnah.com/bukhari:2731. In his commentary on the hadith (in Fatḥ al-Bārī), Ibn Ḥajar explains the event. He makes clear that the Prophet ﷺ expressed approval and encouraged the group to engage in raiding. See https://www.islamweb.net/ar/library/index.php?page=bookcontents&ID=4967&flag=1&bk_no=52 ↑
- Johannes Jansen, The Neglected Duty (Translation) (Macmillan, 1986), 199-200. ↑
- Johannes Jansen, The Neglected Duty (Translation) (Macmillan, 1986), 201-202. ↑
- https://english.religion.info/2002/02/01/document-defence-of-the-muslim-lands/Also see Adnan Zulfiqar, “Jurisdiction over Jihad: Islamic Law and the Duty to Fight.” West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 120, No. 2, 2017 ↑


Alhamdulillah.
Comprehensive, brief, unapologetic. Brilliant as always. Worth sharing everywhere . I struggled to get a clear and complete answer to this for years before someone had the audacity to state that Islam had legitimate offensive wars and had expansionist nature through warfare. This revelation was more close to my heart than years of ‘jihad is ONLY spiritual’, ‘jihad is ONLY defensive’, ‘jihad is ONLY vocal’. Reading history was a nightmare with these incomplete ideas.
This was a brilliant fantastic article brother. I haven’t seen anything like this. But can you please answer the question whether the Arab polytheists had only choice between Islam and the sword? I have come across many statements of even Salaf like Hasan al basri and qatada in Tafasir like tabari and qurtubi that say that the Arab mushrikeen at the time of the prophet pbuh had only choice between either the sword or Islam. Can anyone answer this wallahi i have this question for almost 2 years
Isn’t that how it always goes? The Prophet’s (saws) own people who witness and are challenged to a miracle – are always given only two options – Divine punishment (in this case through the hands of the Muslims) or Acceptance of faith.All the Arabs were challenged to replicate the Qur’an and no one came forward, they had no excuses to deny faith. Within this , Quraysh is a special case since they witnessed the most miracles and they had caused the most harm to Muslims,
Not one of the 9/11 hi hackers had a full beard. Ziad Jarrah called his GF before boarding. Tamerlane Tsarnaev had a GFThe Nice truck driver was gay.Pulse shooter may also have been gaySo much for “Islamic” terrorism
Like @ZaidDiaz said, where did all these downvotes come from all of a sudden?.
paid agents doing their things
just want to ask a thing that kinda create a doubt within my mindbut, is it true that Emir Abdelkader have some kind of connection with the Freemasonry?
Amazing article and a much needed one.I have to say that before knowing about MuslimSkeptic, I used to be scared if someone asked me about jihad and sharia. I would have no answer. But Mashallah after watching a few of Daniel’s debates, the turning of the tables.. I now have nothing to hide and am proud of whole islam including the jihad and sharia.Our religion is beautiful and holistic. This article describes it all in one place and is a good resource Mashallah. Very grateful for this.
Here are some typos that I found. I didn’t know where else to send them.. You can just take the content and then delete this comment without approving it.It has been used justify repressive legislation against -> it has been used *to* justify regressive…Similarly, when Muslims says that adultery should be -> Similarly, when *a Muslim* says…simply declare a jihad -> declare jihadalthough oftentimes -> often timesJazakallah.
Looks like some clown invaded the comment section… why do I see correct comments getting too many downvotes? Or is there any problem on my end only?
Wondering the same thing here as well
Sane here
Thank you very much