Important Academic Resources on the Madkhali Movement

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    One of the most dangerous and damaging global Islamic movements today is known as the “Madkhali” (or “Jami”) movement. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find credible information on this movement and its history. Here we present key quotations from five peer-reviewed Western academic sources on Madkhalism. These sources are:

    1. Michael Farquhar, “Saudi Petrodollars, Spiritual Capital, and the Islamic University of Medina: A Wahhabi Missionary Project in Transnational Perspective.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 47(4)(2015):701-721.
    2. Jarret Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2008).
    3. George Joffé, “The Trojan Horse: The Madkhali Movement in North Africa.” The Journal of North African Studies 23(5)(2018):739-744.
    4. Roel Meijer, “Politicising al-Jarḥ wa-l-Ta‘dil: Rabi‘ b. Hadi al-Madkhali and the Transnational Battle for Religious Authority” In N. Boekhoff-van der Voort; K. Versteegh, K, and J Wagemakers, (eds.), The Transmission and Dynamics of the Textual Sources of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 375-399.
    5. Raihan Ismail, “Saudi Salafi Clerics under MBS: Reform and Survival” Crown Center Middle East Briefs 153 (October 2023).
    6. Stephane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).

    The quotes are given below. The most lengthy, precise, and important quotes come from Lacroix’s “Awakening Islam.” These are presented last.

    For an introduction to Madkhalism in video format, we recommend the following overview: [WATCH] Saajid Lipham and the Madkhali Virus

    Summary

    The quotes demonstrate several key points about the Madkhali movement.

    (A) Madkhalis (Madakhila in Arabic) present themselves as Salafis. However, they are significantly different from other Salafi groups for two reasons. First, they emphasize unconditional and unquestioning obedience to governments in Muslim-majority countries, even when these governments systematically repress Islam and overtly embrace secular liberal laws/policies. Second, Madkhalis constantly attack all other Islamic movements (i.e., “Islamists”) – especially the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, governments use Madkhalis to destroy Islamic movements.

    (B) Madkhalis advocate for secretly cooperating with state intelligence agencies. When they encounter Muslim groups that do not agree with their principles, they report them to the secret police so they can be repressed.

    (C) Madkhalism is a new movement that emerged in Saudi Arabia the 1990s, in response to the first Gulf war.

    (D) The Madkhali movement was created and spread by the Saudi government by providing money, religious positions, jobs, and other patronage to Madkhali figures. Madkhalis have a special loyalty to the Saudi government and work to legitimate its political policies. In other words, Madkhalism is a political tool of the Saudi government.

    (E) Madkhalism has also been aggressively promoted by other Arab states – especially those inclined towards secularism and liberalism. These states favor Madkhalis because they emphasize unconditional and unquestioning obedience to governments, and cooperate with the secret police. Madkhalis also help attack and destroy Islamic movements.

    (F) Madkhalis are a political movement, concerned with aiding the Saudi government and its allies. However, Madkhalis pretend they are not political.

    (G) Saudi Arabia’s Islamic University of Madinah is the foremost Madkhali propaganda hub. It focuses on indoctrinating foreign students – especially those from the West. These students are used to spread Madkhalism abroad. Madkhalis infiltrate religious institutions in the West, and spread the movement’s ideas through the internet and social media.

    We now present quotes from the five academic sources (with page numbers).

    RELATED: Who Are the ”Madkhalis”?

    Source I

    Michael Farquhar, “Saudi Petrodollars, Spiritual Capital, and the Islamic University of Medina: A Wahhabi Missionary Project in Transnational Perspective” International Journal of Middle East Studies 47(4)(2015):701-721

    p.716

    In a parallel development in the course of the 1990s, the IUM [Islamic University of Madinah] also came increasingly under the sway of adherents of a distinctive strand of Salafism most prominently associated with faculty members Muhammad Aman al-Jami and Rabi ibn Hadi al-Madkhali. This mode of Salafism gives pride of place to the purification of creed and the principle of default obedience to incumbent political authority, and it is distinguished by the stridency of its adherents’ attacks on politically engaged Islamists. The Jamiyya or Madkhaliyya, as it is often labeled, came to strongly color the IUM’s missionary project from the 1990s, its proponents backed by the regime as a bulwark against Islamist challenges to Saudi dynastic legitimacy. At the same time as the IUM gained increasing autonomy from migrant actors and resources, its role as an instrument of national state power was thus brought ever more sharply into focus.

    Source II

    Jarret Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2008).

    p 29.

    Madkhali, or Jami, Salafists follow the religious teachings of the Yemeni Shaikh Rabi al-Madkhali and the Ethiopian Shaikh Muhammad Aman Ibn Ali Jami.

    Each term, although derisive because it associates the followers of this school with humans as opposed to God, is a convenient way to characterize the ideological differences of the group vis-à-vis other Salafist subsets. Both Madkhali and Jami were educated in Saudi Arabia. Other important, but lesser-known, ideologues of the group include Mohammad Al-Banna of Egypt and Ali Al-Halabi of Jordan.

    Arab states have generally viewed the Madkhali Salafists as palatable, much like the Establishment Salafists, given their endorsement of secular and democratic forms of government and their unflinching support for local Arab regimes. With Saudi backing, the Madkhalis have firmly entrenched themselves globally, operating out of most Western countries. They have also gone online, so Muslims anywhere around the world can download Madkhali’s teachings.

    In Saudi Arabia, members of the group are more commonly referred to as ‘Jamis’ and are known for their hostility to any political tendency that opposes the authorities. This stance stems from the Salafist principle of listening and obeying religious authority.

    p.30

    Followers of Madkhali Salafism generally allow for the rule of secular law in Islamic countries, justifying it as an ‘action’ as opposed to an Aqidah, or Islamic creed concerned with matters of dogma and doctrine. Publicly referring to the ruling regimes of Arab states as legitimate and therefore calling for Muslims in those states to obey their respective governments, particularly the Saudi royal family, Madkhali Salafists tend to allow the implementation of democratic rule in Islamic states, although they advocate that Salafists remain apolitical in their daily affairs. They argue that the simple fact that the regime has political power proves God’s desire for them to possess such ruling authority. And they are willing to designate those who oppose these governments as Khawarij (“those who go out” – referring to an early Islamic sect who are seen by many Muslims to have left mainstream Islam). It is obligatory, Madkhali Salafists argue, for Muslims to report individuals who deviate from these principles to the authorities.

    Source III

    George Joffé, “The Trojan Horse: The Madkhali Movement in North Africa.” The Journal of North African Studies 23(5)(2018):739-744.

    (An earlier version of this article content is found here.)

    p.739-740

    In essence, Madkhalism is a typical example of quietest Salafism, developed by Rabi al-Madkhali, an expert on hadith at the Islamic University of Medina, supported by his younger brother, Muhammad al-Madkhali, who is also an academic at the same university.

    However, it differs from most other branches of quietist Salafism in its unwavering commitment to the principle of ‘Wali al-Amr’ – the unquestioned and unquestionable authority of a ruling power, however repressive it might be, provided it does not engage in acts of religious infidelity or heresy.

    Whilst respect and acceptance of temporal authority (and thus a rejection of political action) is a commonplace amongst quietist Salafi movements, most withdraw such allegiance if Muslims are subjected to what they may consider unjustified violence.

    The movement is also characterised by its unyielding antagonism towards other Islamist movements, whether quietist, jihadist or connected with the sahwa tradition, and particularly the Ikhwan Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) because of its links to Sayid Qutb whom Madkhalism considers the primeval jihadist.

    It regards all those who oppose its views – and they include Ms May’s bête noire, Abu Qatada al-Filistini – as khawarij in emulation of the early Muslim movement that rejected as takfir (apostates) both the followers of Ali and those who had supported Mu’awiya at the end of the era of the rashidun (‘rightly-guided’) caliphates in the late seventh century.

    Given this intellectual background, it is hardly surprising that the Madakhala has been patronised by the Saudi establishment, particularly after 1990 when the movement rejected the sahwa opposition to the American military presence inside Saudi Arabia as part of the initiative to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

    It received encouragement and financial support in the 1990s as a result, although the Saudi religious establishment increasingly isolated it. Yet, as its influence inside Saudi Arabia declined, its support abroad – in Kuwait, Egypt, Central Asia, Europe and North Africa began to grow.

    In North Africa, in particular, it was tolerated and even encouraged by established regimes because of its endorsement of ‘Wali al-Amr’. This has been particularly the case in Libya.

    Source IV

    Roel Meijer, “Politicising al-Jarḥ wa-l-Ta‘dil: Rabi‘ b. Hadi al-Madkhali and the Transnational Battle for Religious Authority” In Boekhoff-van der Voort, N.; Versteegh, K.; Wagemakers, J. (ed.), The Transmission and Dynamics of the Textual Sources of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 375-399.

    p.376

    The essay thus touches upon one of the central paradoxes of quietist Salafism. For although it pretends to be apolitical or even anti-political and is against internal strife (fitna) within the umma, which supposedly results from politics and machinations, the movement itself uses instruments of power to obtain hegemony in the transnational Islamic movement and ultimately becomes itself a political movement, provoking resistance and ultimately fostering internal strife. This is even more so as Salaism and especially Madkhalism upholds the principle of obedience to the ruler (walī al-amr), which in practice means subservience to the Saudi monarchy.

    p.377

    [Rabi’s] attacks [on the Muslim Brotherhood] started in 1988, when he began giving advice to Abd al-Raḥmān b. Abd al-Khāliq, but they grew in vehemence and included Sayyid Qutḅ ater the Gulf Crisis in 1990 and the first protests against the Saudi state by the so-called awakening shaykhs, Salmān al-Awda and Safar al-Ḥawālī.

    Source V

    Raihan Ismail, “Saudi Salafi Clerics under MBS: Reform and Survival” Crown Center Middle East Briefs 153 (October 2023).

    p.5-6
    Another trend that has emerged is the empowerment of “radical loyalist” clerics, often members of the religious establishment, who go to exceptional lengths to proclaim admiration for Saudi rulers—extending to equating political leaders with historical figures such as the rightly guided caliphs (the first four rulers of the community of believers after the passing of the Prophet) and bestowing on them the title amir al-mu’minin (commander of the faithful).

    This is contrary to the approach of conventionally loyalist ‘ulama, who support and are loyal to the state but tend to contain their enthusiasm for the rulers. “Radical loyalists” are often described as Madkhalis (followers of Sheikh Rabiʿ ibn Hadi al-Madkhali) or Jamiis (followers of Sheikh Muhammad Aman al-Jami)—two ʿulama who were critical of the ‘ulama who opposed the ruling family during the first Gulf War and later attacked them forcefully.

    The radical loyalists have their detractors, who note regretfully that they are at their most powerful under MBS’s rule. The minister for Islamic affairs, Abdullatif Al Al-Sheikh, is one ultraloyalist: He endorses Mohammed bin Salman’s moderate Islam, tweets regularly against perceived enemies of the state, demonizes the Muslim Brotherhood and other such groups, and praises MBS personally for his reform initiatives. It would be wrong to argue that Abdullatif departs from Saudi religious tradition in his radical loyalism: He quotes historical Salafi figures in his interviews, tweets, and lectures. He maintains the Salafi/Wahhabi outlook, albeit selectively. He has made no attempt to dismantle the existing religious tradition in Saudi Arabia or to adopt a different religious tradition.

    Even though some of the social changes introduced by MBS are outside the traditional religious norms in Saudi Arabia, these radical loyalists support and advocate for those changes, denounce critics as enemies of the state, and act as personal advocates for the Crown Prince. They are also obvious beneficiaries of this new regime. Abdullatif was appointed to replace Salih bin Abdulaziz Al Al-Sheikh, whose removal was rumored to be a response to his perceived sympathy for the Sahwa movement and the Muslim Brotherhood. These rumors might have been started and then exaggerated to taint his reputation before he was eased out in favor of his successor.

    But beyond benefiting from MBS’s regime, there is an ideological basis for the support that the radical loyalist clerics give to the Crown Prince. The Madkhalis and Jamiis are absolute loyalists. As a matter of doctrine and not merely politics, these clerics consider that one must support the ruler even if he violates Sharia (the Islamic legal code). The Madkhalis thus consider support for the ruler to be a religious obligation. Their understanding of correct clerical-state relations is one in which the proper role of the clerics is to support every ruler’s actions, no matter how transgressive. This interpretation—that a ruler, and only a ruler, makes decisions in the interest of the public, and so has the supreme and unimpeachable authority to act according to his own judgment—finds some justification within the Salafi tradition, even if only a minority of Salafis accept it.

    Criticizing the ruler, it is believed, will only create hostility, instability, and dissension. It is upon this doctrinal footing that clerics such as Abdullatif have no qualms regarding their unstinting support for MBS and whatever he does, while also maintaining their Salafi identity. Absolute loyalism is a transnational trend; many of its adherents are not even Saudi nationals. The Kuwaiti Salim al-Taweel and the Egyptian Said Raslan have both delivered lectures defending MBS from a Madkhali perspective.

    Source VI

    Stephane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).

    As mentioned above, this source is the most detailed, authoritative and important. Below follows a ten-page section from the book p.211-221

    p.211-221

    The Jamis: Between Purism and Loyalty

    The first and most effective of these countermovements is known as the Jami movement.

    In the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it asserted itself as both an implacable opponent of the Sahwi opposition and an ardent defender of the royal family. It soon gave rise to a relatively organized network that extended its reach to most cities in the kingdom. The term “Jami,” which has become widespread, was first used by the Sahwis. It refers to Sheikh Muhammad Aman al-Jami, born in 1930, head of the Faculty of Hadith at the Islamic University of Medina and one of most vocal opponents of the Sahwi protest. As had been the case with “Sururi,” the use of “Jami” was intended to delegitimate the adversary by stigmatizing his foreign origin because al-Jami was from Ethiopia and immigrated to Saudi Arabia only when he was twenty. For lack of a more neutral term, however, the label “Jami” will be used here because the Jamis have refused to identify themselves other than by such unspecific qualifiers as “the salafis” or sometimes “the ulema of Medina,” because the most eminent among them were based there, mainly at the Islamic University. They were also recognizable because they sometimes added to their names the suffixes al-salafi or al-athari (from athar, tradition, that is, that of the Prophet and the pious ancestors), which the Sahwis deplored, arguing that only God could decide who was a proper salafi and who was not. Although al-Jami, despite himself, gave his name to the movement, its most emblematic figure was Sheikh Rabiʿ bin Hadi al-Madkhali.

    Born in 1931, he taught until the late 1990s in the Faculty of Hadith at the Islamic University of Medina, which was chaired by al-Jami until his death in 1995. Although he was a student of al-Albani and had briefly been close to the JSM [al-Jamaʿa al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba] in the mid-1970s, al-Madkhali had managed not to go to prison and thereafter had demonstrated exemplary loyalty to the regime. In the late 1980s he made a name in the Saudi religious field with a very controversial book, The Method Followed by the Prophets in Religious Preaching Contains Wisdom and Reason. Faithful to his Ahl al-Hadith beliefs, he explained that the priority in matters of daʿwa should be the purification of the creed.

    He thus fiercely attacked the Pakistani ideologue Abu al-Aʿla Mawdudi, the founder of Jamaat-e Islami and a source of inspiration for Sayyid Qutb, for his concern with politics and his efforts to build an Islamic state in India “although the Indian people are ignorant of Islam and their religious practice is tainted with innovation and deviance.” In al-Madkhali’s view, Mawdudi’s priority should have been to correct the creed of the Indians instead.

    As tension between the Sahwa and the government was increasing, al-Madkhali was one of the first ulema openly to criticize the Sahwi sheikhs in August 1990. He was soon joined in what became the Jami movement by other religious figures from the loyalist wing of the Ahl al-Hadith, in particular, Falih al-Harbi, a former member of the JSM who, unlike al- Madkhali, had spent time in Saudi jails, Farid alMaliki, Mahmud al- Haddad, and Ali Rida bin Ali Rida. For those sheikhs whose worldview had developed in explicit opposition to the Sahwa, this was a perfectly natural position to adopt. After the loyalist Ahl al-Hadith had started being looked at favorably by the regime because of their stance during the Afghan jihad, it was also a way for them to complete their return to favor with the authorities.

    In return, the Saudi government provided abundant support to the Jami movement, notably through the minister of the interior, Prince Nayef. The significant material and institutional resources it soon had at its disposal made it attractive to those who felt marginalized in the social arena or in the religious field. To many, Jamism became a strategy for social or religious ascent. A large number of those who joined the movement were non-Saudi residents. The example of Usama ʿAtaya al-Filastani is instructive in this regard: born in a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan, he was raised in Saudi Arabia, where his father worked. By the conclusion of his secondary education in 1990, he was passionately interested in religion and wanted to enroll in the Islamic University of Medina, but he was refused admission because non-Saudis living in the kingdom were barred from Saudi universities.

    At the same time, he achieved a certain reputation among the ulema of his city, Rabigh. When he joined the Jamis, he finally secured the connections (wasita) he needed to enroll in the Islamic University in 1993. Ten years later he became one of the major figures in the Jami movement, where he demonstrated remarkable zeal, to judge from the titles of some of his works: The Strong Proofs of the Necessity to Defend the Saudi State and To Repel the Zionist Aggression against the Al Saʿud, the Family of Jihad and Mujahideen. In the interim he had adopted the name Abu ʿUmar al-ʿUtaybi, hoping by attaching himself to one of the major tribes on the peninsula, ʿUtayba, to conceal the signs of his social marginality.

    Along with non- Saudi residents, the ranks of the Jamis contained many people from peripheral and socially marginalized regions of the kingdom. The Jazan region on the Yemeni border was particularly well represented, including, among the leading figures of the movement, ulema such as Rabiʿ al- Madkhali, Muhammad al-Madkhali, Zayd al-Madkhali (these three belonged to the same tribe), Ali al-Fuqaihi, and Ahmad al-Najmi. Coming from a region that traditionally did not produce major Wahhabi ulema, these figures were thereby claiming a place in the religious field. This strong presence in the Jami movement of figures from the Jazan region, inhabited by the Bani Yam tribe, earned it the nickname in some Sahwi circles of Bani Jam. The term was intended to be particularly injurious because the name Bani Yam had strong associations with the Ismaili branch of Shiism, which was still practiced by a significant number of its members.

    Although individuals lacking in social capital initially dominated the Jami movement, over time growing numbers of peripheral ulema in search of increased status joined, regardless of their social origins.

    Classic examples are Abd al-Aziz al-ʿAskar and Sulayman Aba al-Khayl, two ulema from Najd described as thoroughly marginal in the religious field before the Gulf War, who became hard-core Jamis in the early 1990s. For instance, Abd al- Aziz al-ʿAskar is known for having called in one of his sermons for the execution of Salman al-ʿAwda and Safar al- Hawali and for having openly rejoiced at the execution of Abdallah al- Hudayf. As a result of their zeal, they were appointed to high positions: al-ʿAskar became the chairman of the department of daʿwa at Imam University, while Aba al-Khayl was first given the strategic position of dean of student aff airs at the university annex in the Qasim and then that of vice president. The Jami movement became so attractive that soon ulema active in the Sahwi opposition left the protest to join it, including Abd al-Muhsin al-ʿUbaykan and ʿIsam al- Sinani, even though the latter had previously signed the Memorandum of Advice.

    Starting in 1993, positions opened up by the dismissal of Sahwis were almost systematically offered to the new Jami converts. At the Islamic University of Medina, for example, the Sahwis Musa al-Qarni, Abd al-Aziz Qariʾ, and Jubran al-Jubran were replaced by the Jamis Tarahib al-Dawsari (author under the pseudonym Abu Ibrahim al-ʿAdnani of one of the most emblematic books of Jamism, Qutbism Is Fitna, So Learn How to Recognize It), Sulayman al-Ruhayli, and Abd al-Salam al-Suhaymi. In Haʾil the Jami Abdallah al-ʿUbaylan replaced a Sahwi at the head of the office of religious affairs. Many more such anecdotes were duly recorded in the publications of the CDLR and MIRA.

    The discourse of the Jamis had two main foci: vehemently opposing the Sahwa and demonstrating intense loyalty to the Saudi royal family.

    In their radical critique of the Sahwa, the Jamis relied heavily on the Ahl al-Hadith who made up the core of their movement and had the best-tried oppositional discourse to the Sahwa. As a result, their favorite target was the Sahwis’ creed. Identifying them with the Muslim Brotherhood, they reiterated al- Albani’s attacks on Sayyid Qutb, accused of adhering to the “heterodox” doctrine of the oneness of being, and they quoted over and over the remarks of leading Brothers who had shown indulgence or support toward the cult of saints.

    Acknowledging implicitly that the orthodoxy of the creed of some Sahwis—who, like Safar al- Hawali, had dedicated entire books to denouncing the “deviations” of Sufi s and Ashʿarites— could not easily be questioned, the Jamis introduced a new distinction: these Sahwis might be salafis in terms of creed (ʿaqida), they explained, but their methodology (manhaj) was not orthodox. In other words, what they believed might conform to what the pious ancestors believed, but the methods they used were blameworthy innovations (bidaʿ), so they were not true salafis.

    Inspired by the Ahl al- Hadith, the Jami attacks on the Sahwis’ methodology targeted their interest in politics, which allegedly turned them away from ʿilm.The Jamis added to that a relatively new accusation, formulated for the first time by the former JSM member Muqbil al-Wadiʿi in The Way out of Fitna. The Sahwis, as always identified with the Muslim Brotherhood, were guilty of hizbiyya, which might be translated as “factionalism,” designating organization in parties (singular hizb), which goes against the principle of unity inherent in salafi Islam. Jami critiques also aimed at Sahwi methods in the most technical sense: the whole infrastructure of the Sahwa, from the circles for the memorization of the Koran to the summer camps, as well as Islamic
    chants and the use of theater, were denounced as reprehensible innovations.

    At the same time, the Jamis constantly denounced the Sahwa’s alleged hostility to existing regimes. For these ulema, obedience to the government was an absolute obligation. This insistence led Muhammad Surur, mocking their eagerness to defend the Saudi royal family, to call them the “party of the rulers” (hizb al-wula). The Jamis added to this unfailing loyalty an unconditional respect for the ulema of the official religious institution, particularly for the Committee of Senior Ulema, whose fatwas, in their view, could not be subject to the slightest criticism.

    The Jamis’ principal form of action was to produce dozens of refutations (rudud) of the writings and declarations of their Sahwi adversaries.

    They described this practice as an extension of the science of critique and fair evaluation (ʿilm al- jarh wa-l-taʿdil), which the Ahl al-Hadith had made the essence of their study of the hadith. For the Jamis, not only the transmitters of hadith but anyone who spoke in the name of Islam had to be subjected to this process. Because of the very large number of refutations of Sayyid Qutb, Salman al-ʿAwda, Safar al-Hawali, and other members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Sahwa that he had written, Rabiʿ al- Madkhali was given by his disciples the prestigious title of “bearer of the flag of critique and fair evaluation in our time” (hamil liwaʾ al- jarh wa-l-taʿdil fi hadha al-ʿasr).

    The Jamis even broadened the reach of their refutations by stepping into the Sahwis’ favorite field: the Islamic cassette. Jami stores for Islamic recordings sprang up in Saudi cities in 1990 and 1991, often not far from those run by Sururis or Muslim Brothers, hoping to compete with them. These stores sold cassettes exclusively from ulema such as Rabiʿ al-Madkhali, Muhammad Aman al-Jami, and Falih al-Harbi. The Jamis also multiplied their public lectures with the support of the authorities, who hastened to find venues for them. They even went so far as to impose themselves in places considered Sahwi bastions. Hence in the Prince Mitʿab Mosque in Jeddah, where Safar al-Hawali taught on Sundays, al-Jami was given the right to give a lesson on Thursdays.

    This sometimes led to physical confrontations between Sahwis and Jamis. In the early 1990s Muhammad Aman al-Jami was attacked in the middle of a sermon in al-Jawhara Mosque in Riyadh (where al-ʿUbaykan had launched the movement of protest in October 1990) by a group of young Sahwis, “one of whom tried to hit him with his microphone.”

    Shortly thereafter Salih al-Suhaymi and Abd al-Razzaq al-ʿAbbad, sent to Burayda by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs to uphold the Jami line, were interrupted while preaching when young Sahwis cut the electricity, disabling the loudspeakers, and started chanting, “Burayda rejects you, you Jami!” According to some accounts, al-Suhaymi was struck in the face, and his glasses were broken.

    Similar confrontations led to a major incident, the violent aggression in Haʾil against the Jami sheikh Abdallah al-ʿUbaylan, who had to be taken to a hospital emergency ward. Dozens of young Sahwis were subsequently arrested.

    The Jamis also made it a practice to write reports on their Sahwi colleagues, which they transmitted to the secret police— with which their fatwas urged cooperation— with the aim of encouraging them to act against their rivals. Sahwi literature mentions these reports frequently, but one was an object of special attention, for good reason, because, according to Saʿd al- Faqih, it was largely responsible for convincing the government that the Sahwa represented a danger that had to be suppressed. Its title is eloquent: The Secret World Organization, between Planning and Application in Saudi Arabia— Documents and Facts. Long excerpts were printed in an article by the radical Palestinian Islamist ideologue Abu Qatada, who had obtained a copy. Its authors, who identify themselves as “the loyal salafis” (salafiyyu ahl al-walaʾ), denounce the existence of a secret Islamist organization inspired by the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, with the goal of overthrowing the regime. In describing it, they mix genuine facts tied to the activities of the Sahwi jamaʿat (for example, their use of the summer camps, scouts, and mosque “libraries”) with contrived elements, such as the existence of organic ties between the Sahwa and foreign Islamist groups and personalities, notably Hasan al- Turabi. They conclude by calling on authorities to end the activities of this organization.

    The Jami attacks intensified starting in 1991 and 1992 and forced the Sahwa to develop defenses by redefining its discourse and action.

    To counter the accusation that they paid too little attention to ʿilm, the Sahwis multiplied courses and lectures in which they turned away from contemporary politics to concentrate on the classics of the Wahhabi corpus. For example, Salman al-ʿAwda taught a series of 146 classes in Burayda on The Attainment of the Objective, a collection of hadiths by the medieval traditionist Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqalani (1372–1448). Around the same time, Safar al- Hawali intensified his classes in Jeddah on The Profession of Faith of al-Tahawi. The organization of a great competition for the memorization of the sunna in Burayda by Salman al-ʿAwda in October 1992 followed the same logic. More generally, reacting to the Jamis’ identification of the Sahwa with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Sahwis tried “to shed their Muslim Brotherhood skin.” The change was particularly visible in the jamaʿat’s study circles.

    Works by Muslim Brothers were now taught less frequently, while intensive courses on the writings of Ibn al- Wahhab were added to the curricula. Starting in 1993, this practice became systematic with the establishment of a new kind of extracurricular activity, “scientific training sessions” (al- dawrat al-ʿilmiyya), intended to give young Sahwis a solid knowledge of the Wahhabi corpus.

    At the same time, the Sahwis denied any lack of respect for the senior ulema, particularly Ibn Baz and Ibn ʿUthaymin. They even engaged in a veritable bidding war with their Jami rivals in showing esteem and consideration for the two sheikhs. Nasir al-ʿUmar published a pamphlet, The Flesh of the Ulema Is Poisoned, in which he denounced everyone who attacked the ulema, while Salman al-ʿAwda delivered a sermon titled “The Breeze of Hejaz on the Biography of Ibn Baz,” in which he presented the life of the venerable sheikh as a model for all Muslims. At the same time, the Sahwis encouraged their followers to attend lectures by Ibn Baz and Ibn ʿUthaymin so as not to abandon the field to the Jamis.

    The real issue soon became whether the Jamis or the Sahwis enjoyed the support of Ibn Baz, but he, retaining his papal role, refused to choose, sometimes supporting one group, sometimes the other. The ambiguity of this position was at the source of the so- called war of tazkiyat (recommendations) that the Jamis and Sahwis began to wage against each other in 1992. It began with a long communiqué from Ibn Baz published in the Saudi press on January 2, 1992, in which the old sheikh declared: “A rumor has been circulating recently that some of those who claim to represent ʿilm and daʿwa have questioned the reputations of well- known preachers. . . . They do this secretly in their meetings, and it is even said that they make their remarks in public lectures in mosques and that they have recorded them on cassettes that are circulating among the people. This attitude is contrary to what God and His prophet have commanded.”

    The Sahwa was quick to see in these words a disavowal of its Jami adversaries. Safar al-Hawali and ʿAʾid al- Qarni each devoted an entire sermon to justifying this interpretation. The Jamis, on the defensive, categorically rejected this interpretation of the communiqué. A month later, on February 6, 1992, a delegation led by al-Jami and al-Madkhali went to Ibn Baz to seek from him a declaration enabling them to counter the Sahwa’s attacks. Still intent on staying above disputes, Ibn Baz assured them of his support: “We have not the slightest doubt about our brothers, the noted sheikhs of Medina,” he said. “We know them for their uprightness, their ʿilm, and the correctness of their creed.” Thousands of copies of pamphlets and cassettes containing these remarks by Ibn Baz were distributed by the Jamis and their supporters in competition with the wide distribution of Ibn Baz’s previous communiqué by the Sahwis. The war of tazkiyat did not stop there and even grew in magnitude.

    In late 1992 the condemnation of the Memorandum of Advice by the Council of the Committee of Senior Ulema, which accused the signatories of “intellectual deviance and defending the principles of foreign movements and parties,” was distributed by the Jamis, who saw it as full and open adherence to their line. In response, the Sahwis circulated copies of a recording of Ibn Baz defending al-ʿAwda and al- Hawali in a 1992 meeting at the home of Nasir al- Umar, along with the laudatory preface that the old sheikh had written for the book Separation and Mixture, published around the same time by Salman al-ʿAwda. Sahwis also put together a compilation titled The Senior Ulema Speak about the Preachers, which contained older and newer recorded passages in which Ibn Baz, Ibn ʿUthaymin, Ibn Quʿud, Ibn Jibrin, and even al- Albani (who, because he was in the process of becoming “papal,” was now looking for a modus vivendi with his former adversaries) praised al-ʿAwda and al- Hawali. This cassette, too, was distributed in large quantities.

    These various Sahwi attempts, however, did not succeed in stopping the Jami momentum. By 1993 Jamis had established a significant presence in Saudi religious circles. It was only then that the Jami movement started to be weakened, principally by a series of splits that largely resulted from the contradictions inherent in its discourse and the composition of its membership. Th e first split saw the emergence of a “Haddadist” submovement that, following the line of the Egyptian Mahmud al- Haddad, advocated total ijtihad and the rejection of some collections of hadiths traditionally used by Wahhabi ulema, such as The Victory of the Creator by Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqalani and The Forty by Imam Muhyi al-Din al- Nawawi (1234– 1278), because their authors adhered to the Ashʿarite conception of creed, considered heterodox by the Wahhabis. Despite this, the Saudi ulema had accepted these works because they were classics of Sunnism and did not deal with questions of creed. As Yusuf al-Dayni explains, “Al- Haddad was bringing out a fundamental contradiction of the Jamis. He was telling them: you are not coherent; how can you criticize Safar al-Hawali while saying not a word about Ibn Hajar and al- Nawawi, who are not even salafis?” This redefinition of the contours of the Wahhabi corpus had problematic implications because it called into question the authority of the senior ulema who were its official guardians. In this sense it was incompatible with the loyalty advocated by the Jamis.

    This explains why refuting al- Haddad and those who joined him, like Farid al- Maliki, became for al- Madkhali and his associates a full- time occupation, to some extent diverting their attention from the Sahwis.

    A second schism arose out of the contradiction between adherence to the Ahl al-Hadith line and the proclaimed intent to follow the Wahhabi ulema of the kingdom. As was shown earlier, al-Albani and his disciples had been remarkably critical of the unspoken Hanbalism of the Wahhabis. The loyalist Ahl al-Hadith had attempted to downplay this aspect of their discourse, but some Jamis who supported the official ulema and were unhappy with the predominance of the Ahl al- Hadith line in the movement used it to challenge the authority of Rabiʿ al- Madkhali and Falih al- Harbi. Led by Abd al- Latif Bashumayyil, a former engineer who had become the owner of the principal Jami Islamic recordings store in Jeddah, and Musa al- Duwaysh, who taught at the Islamic University of Medina, they dug up from the writings and recordings of al- Albani all his stands hostile to Wahhabism for the sole purpose of embarrassing the major Jami sheikhs.

    Following that, there were more exchanges of refutations, further reducing the focus on the conflict with the Sahwa and, eventually, the impact of the Jami movement.

    RELATED: Muslims Must Boycott Companies That Support Israel (Don’t Fall for the Madkhali Trap)

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    Daniel Haqiqatjou
    Daniel Haqiqatjou
    Daniel Haqiqatjou (pronounced: Ha-qee-qat-joo) was born in Houston, Texas. He attended Harvard University where he majored in Physics and minored in Philosophy. He completed a Masters degree in Philosophy at Tufts University.

    30 COMMENTS

    1. Two main points of critique:

      1. The use of exclusively Western academics.
      1. The lack of sourcing. For example:

      “Madkhalism has also been aggressively promoted by other Arab states – especially those inclined towards secularism and liberalism.”

      This claim is absolutely incorrect. For instance: Morocco officially promotes Sufism. So do most countries in North-Africa. The Syrian government actively promotes Shiism not Sunnism and definitely not any form of Salafism.

      • Qatar is openly on the Ikhwani line. UAE facilitates many groups as long as they deem them moderate and not a threat to the ruling order. That’s why a Ashari Sufi like Bin Bayyah is there.

        “Followers of Madkhali Salafism generally allow for the rule of secular law in Islamic countries, justifying it as an ‘action’ as opposed to an Aqidah, or Islamic creed concerned with matters of dogma and doctrine.”

        On which specific sources is this based i.e. ‘allow for the rule of secular law’?

        • “Although al-Jami, despite himself, gave his name to the movement,”

          Al-Jami never gave his name to a movement. He very much disliked harakats and hizbs. He simply believed to be someone on the Quran and Sunnah according to the way of the Salaf i.e. Salafi. Jami is just the name his opponents give people who have similar views as Al-Jami.

          “First, they emphasize unconditional and unquestioning obedience to governments in Muslim-majority countries,”

          False.

          • For instance copy paste this in the search bar of YT

            “Does a Muslim ruler have unconditional obedience? | Shaykh Muhammad Aman al-Jami”

            and

            “Why Do The Scholars Remain Silent Over The Rulers’ Evil? | Shaykh Muhammad Aman al-Jami رحمه الله”

        • I agree with you saying that Qatar is promoting Muslim Brotherhood. They promote what promotes changing Islam from within, as Muslim Brotherhood do, by aligning Islam with liberal values. For instance, Al-Qaradhawi promoted almost every aspect of liberalism by using arguments from Islam. He muslim-washed liberalism. So did Tariq Ramadan before being caught fornicating with numerous women while being married. So did Hassan Iquioussen and Nabil Ennasri from France sphere.

      • “The use of exclusively Western academics.”

        This is such a lazy and dumb critique. The only people that use this critique are the madkhalis themselves which, in this case, is yourself. Madkhali is a modern deviant sect. So no way they can be found in Quran and Sunnah just like Ikhwanis, or Wahhabis, or Salafis are not found in Quran and Sunnah. Moreover, if modern Arab scholars talk about madkhalis you guys will either call them deviant Khariji, or your Arab puppets will put them in prison.

        • “This is such a lazy and dumb critique.”

          Not at all. I said this because Daniel is very skeptical of Western academics himself. Especially in regards to Islam and Muslims. Solely relying on Westerners to make your case is therefore weak and opportunistic.

          “Madkhali is a modern deviant sect.”

          First of all is it really a sect? And secondly: why are they ‘deviant’? The only real critique ‘Sahwis’ have of them is that they deem them overly loyal to the rulers.

          • The critiques are generally based on emotional arguments and ray/opinion rather than on daleel.

            The opposite critique is that Sahwis (Ikhwani) get accussed of being wreckless havoc makers that create a lot of chaos in Muslim lands because they like to rile the public up against the ruler, organize protests/social unrest and sometimes turn to assasinations and terrrorism. Which is true: most terror groups are ideologically contected to Sayyid Qutb.

            • I honestly do not know what this means. Give me a clear definition and I’ll be able to answer you.

              If you mean follower of Shaykh Rabi’ then that wouldn’t apply to me as I’m only mildly familiar with his (aqidah) work – which I found to be beneficial. What I know is that he is a hadith scholar. I’ve husn dann with regards to Muslims in general and the ulama in particular as they are the inheritors of the prophets. But this doesn’t mean infallibility.

      • “In November 2002, King Moham­med VI replaced Abdelkebir Alaoui M’daghri, who had been minister of Islamic Affairs for 18 years, with historian Ahmed Taoufiq, a Sufi fol­lower of the Tariqa Boutchichiya.
        As the head of the powerful minis­try, Taoufiq advocated the rehabili­tation of Sufi Islam, popular among millions of Moroccans and loathed by Salafi orthodoxy.”

        Sufism in Morocco ‘a powerful weapon’ against extremism, Thearabweekly

        • “The rise of Sufism in the North African kingdom was boosted by a US think-tank RAND report in 2004, three years after the attacks of Sep­tember 11th.
          RAND’s report called for the George W. Bush administration to encourage Sufi movements in Mus­lim countries to isolate the growing Salafist extremist and Wahhabi ide­ologies that were threatening the West.”

        • “Taoufiq advocated the rehabili­tation of Sufi Islam, popular among millions of Moroccans”

          Why do you need to rehabilitate something if it’s already popular? It needs “rehabilitation” exactly because it isn’t popular and you wish to popularize it. Mysticism isn’t going to work with people who have a rationalist mindset. Mostly true for todays youth. In fact it will lead to them abandoning religion entirely. Mysticism is mostly seen as weird, strange and awkwardly funny.

          • Sufism and pseudo-salafism are both used by rulers to obtain obedience from people since these two sects are focused on self improvment and leave politics and social issues to rulers. These rulers are also able to manipulate takfirist groups to create a state of terror that benefit them. Every deviant is likely to be manipulated for political purpose. Secularists movements like feminism could also be useful since feminism weakens the whole society by igniting sex war and destroying manhood.

    2. “Rabiʿ al- Madkhali was given by his disciples the prestigious title of “bearer of the flag of critique and fair evaluation in our time” (hamil liwaʾ al- jarh wa-l-taʿdil fi hadha al-ʿasr).”

      Al-Albani said this about Al-Madkhali.

      • Al-Albani had huge problems to analyse facts. His knowledge was very theoritical, learned from books in library. Some of his fatawa were disconnected from reality like fatawa about Palestine, about Hijra. I think he was over-ranked thanks to in fanbase

        • People like you are not in a status to criticise our Shaykh Al-Albaani. Just look at his followers,and also his simple lives.The only people who hate Shaykh al albaani are raafidhi quburi or enemy of islam/sunnah.Read his book and may Allah guide you into Islam.

    3. I detest the use of western academia & their “peer reviews” are just subscriptions to the status quo.

      Morocco, Jordan, Pakistan & other governments are not Madkhalis, Qutubis or Sufis, however they pacify Saudi Arabia as the head-puppet in the colonial power structure & as a bonus sometimes Madkhali arguments can be utilized by their own governments too.

      • Qaradawi was a liberal masquerading as a traditional. Tariq Ramadan is a zindiq stooge. Not all Ikhwanis are like them however.

        My 2 cents.

        • Nabil Ennasri, in France, was the media expert about Qatar that he promoted, until we were told that he received cash directly from Qatar to promote this country and its agenda to reform islam from within. For instance, this guy pushed the narrarative for global warming by going from France to Mecca with a bycicle “to alert about global warming”. During Covid era, ikhwani leaders pushed the mainstream narrative during friday prayer. Muslim Brotherhood are even more wicked than pseudo-salafis.

        • Stupid comment.

          Anyone can use any argument, of course.

          That doesn’t mean every argument on the planet is valid – either rationally or in light of Quran and Sunnah.

          @Sly, I don’t know about that Ennasri guy, neither do I have any soft spot for the founders and stalwarts of the Ikhwanis & Qutubis. My implication by not all are same was towards everyday common Muslims who identify with these movements and their founders without knowing much about them.

          • True. You can split nowadays Muslim Brotherhood in two parts : its rulers which are so aligned with liberalism that that one of them, in mosque, told to the audience that he doesn’t want disbelievers to turn to islam. Al-Qaradhawi stated that religious diversity is good since Allah wanted it. The second part is the daily activists who have some inclination toward liberalism but don’t fully align with it. In France, I avoid friday prayer leaded by both pseudo-salafis and ikhwanis.

            • Al-Qaradawi said he didn’t mind if a Copt would rule Egypt i.e. a kafir would rule over Muslims in Muslim lands. Which obviously is in clear contradiction to Quranic injunction.

              He also worked for Sunni-Shia unity. But later admitted that Salafis were right about the danger herein, and the fact that the Shia were being deceptive. He was atleast honest enough to admit this.

              Ikhwani ideology is heavily influenced by Marxism. Which isn’t strange. Qutb lived during its peak years.

            • Insha’Allah his repentence is accepted. Issue is: his books contain many problematic and dangerous passages – attacking the messengers of Allah, takfir, khariji ideas etc. Ideas that have resulted in much bloodshed in Muslim countries, stagnation and instablility.

              Shiism is an Eastern Orthodox building with an Islamic exterior.

              Ikhwani ideology is a Marxist building with an Islamic exterior.

            • You are correct but even the salafi scholars rh have noted that qutub was writing what he wrote whoel slanting the religion so in one year he might have wrote something than after getting new knowledge for that topic he either retracted on that statement or continued promoting it you are correct about the Shias I would comepare the Shias to Hindus or Catholics as well and Zoroastrians.

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