We are yet to see a clear, effective response from the Indian government in relation to the April 22, 2025 Pahalgam attack in occupied Jammu & Kashmir. The attack had witnessed the killing of 28 Indian tourists, mostly men. The victims were reportedly identified as belonging to the Hindu religion.

Many from the Indian public view the post-attack measures as appearing confused and arguably self-defeating rather than being strategically directed against Pakistan. Of course, Pakistan still considers it to have been a false-flag operation and has called for neutral investigations into the happenings of the event. Suspiciously, however, this proposal has been persistently rejected by India.

Indus Waters Treaty (IWT): Strategic Misstep for India

India has spoken of putting the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty “in abeyance,” stopping short of full withdrawal, thus highlighting its obvious awareness of the diplomatic risks. The treaty, brokered by the World Bank, granted India the façade of a legal and moral high ground. By now undermining it, India risks weaking its image on the global stage as a “violator of international law.”

For Pakistan, the shift confirms its long-standing claim: that India never actually valued the treaty to begin with; and that it had exploited treaty loopholes in the past to build (or envision building) hydroelectric projects on rivers allocated to Pakistan, like the Jhelum River. Now, Islamabad believes the world is finally catching on to India’s duplicity.

Aside from the diplomatic win, it is also a symbolic win for Pakistan too. India has targeted a water-sharing agreement that is vital to Pakistan’s civilian population, particularly in agrarian Punjab and Sindh. This clearly contradicts New Delhi’s claim that its actions are exclusively directed against Pakistan’s military forces and not the country’s civilian population. The fact that even India’s self-identified “liberals” have adopted a hawkish stance on this issue, without evidencing a trace of having any moral dilemmas over the potential starvation of 250 million people, has reinforced the perception that the entirety of India’s Hindu population fully supports a hypothetical genocide of Pakistanis.

Water scarcity is considered an “existential threat” by Pakistani decision-makers. And unlike India, Pakistan does not adhere to a “No First Use” (NFU) nuclear doctrine, adding a layer of strategic risk to any water-related aggressions. The strong words from Khawaja Muhammad Asif, Pakistan’s Defence Minister, can be understood in light of this:

Speaking on the Geo News programme “Naya Pakistan”, the defence minister said: “Certainly, if they attempt to build any kind of structure, we will strike it.” He said that building any structure on the Indus River by violating the IWT would be seen as Indian aggression against Pakistan.

 

“Aggression is not just about firing cannons or bullets; it has many faces. One of those faces is [blocking or diverting water], which could lead to deaths due to hunger and thirst,” he added.

 

The security czar warned: “If they make any architectural attempt, then Pakistan will destroy that structure.”

 

“But for now, we are heading to forums available to us, starting from the IWT [Indus Waters Treaty]. We will pursue this matter.”

India also risks emboldening China into using their own strategy against them. You see, China now has greater justification to pursue dam-building and river diversions on the Brahmaputra, which is vital to India’s northeast region.

Furthermore, perhaps quite ironically in fact, India gains very little in terms of immediate benefit. Major dam projects could take 15–20 years to build, and construction risks flooding its “own” regions in Jammu & Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh.

RELATED: Blackouts in Kashmir After Death of Kashmiri Separatist

Simla Agreement or Suspension as Strategic Leverage

In response to India’s move to place the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in “abeyance,” Pakistan has suspended the Simla Agreement, i.e., the 1972 peace accord signed after the Bangladesh War.

Pakistan had long viewed the bilateral framework imposed by the Simla Agreement as restrictive. It effectively ensured that the Kashmir dispute remained confined to India and Pakistan, thereby blocking third-party mediation, especially from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and, more critically, the United Nations (UN), whose 1948–49 Security Council Resolutions called for a plebiscite allowing Kashmiris to decide their own political future.

Pakistan has also argued that India violated the spirit of the Simla Agreement by carrying out drastic unilateral actions, most notably the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, which had granted Jammu & Kashmir a degree of autonomy.

Now, by opening up the door to voiding the Simla Agreement, India may have inadvertently strengthened Pakistan’s hand, allowing it to re-internationalize the Kashmir issue, particularly by calling for renewed attention towards the UN resolutions.

Economic Decoupling: Who Suffers More?

Economically, Pakistan has already severed most of its trade ties with India since 2019. This was as a result of the tense geopolitical situation following the 2019 Pulwama attacks, when dozens of Indian security personnel were targeted in Jammu & Kashmir.

In 2024, Pakistani exports to India were less than $500,000. Though some select sectors (like pharma) have traditionally relied on Indian imports, it could in fact be a blessing in disguise, pushing Pakistan to pursue diversifying, by deepening ties with China, Iran, and Central Asia, as well as investing in domestic industries.

But the costs may be significantly higher for India.

Pakistan’s airspace closures force Indian flights to reroute. This increases fuel costs, ticket prices, and delayed cargo, which can be an especially big problem when it comes to perishable goods. Indian media reports that Air India, the country’s flag carrier or national airline, might face losses of up to $600 million a year due to the extra costs.

Likewise, the closure of the Attari-Wagah border cuts off India’s quickest overland trade route to Central Asia. India is now forced to rely on Iran’s Chabahar Port, a longer, more costly route that is already under a notable amount of strain due to American sanctions and infrastructural limits. Strategically, this undermines India’s goal of being a regional connector, and it gives China the upper hand in Central Asia via the Belt and Road Initiative, which now appears more practical to regional states.

RELATED: Kashmir: The Forgotten Struggle and the Terror of Hindu Nationalism

Pan-Islamism Saved Pakistan?

India has largely exhausted both its diplomatic capital and its ability to exert economic pressure on Pakistan. All of these options as well as certain others—from revoking the visas of Pakistani nationals staying in India, to cracking down on Pakistani social media accounts—appear more cosmetic rather than anything substantial.

So what prevents it from leveraging its undisputed advantage of overwhelming military superiority? The Hindu masses certainly dream of such a potentially “spectacular” show, and it would surely feed their insatiable hunger for violence against Muslims.

By all conventional metrics, India holds a decisive advantage.

• Its defense budget is 7 to 8 times greater than that of Pakistan.
• With a much larger population, India has greater manpower reserves, both for immediate deployment and long-term mobilization.
• It might not dominate in the area of airpower (considering the Pakistan Air Force’s capabilities) but very well could in relation to its naval capabilities, particularly since it boasts blue-water capacity in comparison to Pakistan’s coastal defense orientation.

Yet, despite the above, any sort of full-scale military conflict has been consistently avoided. The first and most obvious reason is Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. Another is that, as a regional power with a credible second-strike capability, Pakistan renders any war too costly for India.

But there’s another deterrent that is not discussed as much: Pan-Islamic diplomacy, especially through the Gulf states, primarily Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These countries have historically helped de-escalate tensions between India and Pakistan via backchannel diplomacy, as has even been reported by Indian media.

Ironically, India’s outreach to the Gulf, led by its Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Modi, has made it more sensitive to the Gulf’s Pan-Islamic influence. While India deepens its ties with the Gulf for energy security, trade, and even diaspora diplomacy, this engagement has also strengthened the Gulf’s standing and ability to mediate during Indo-Pak crises. Many Pakistani elites, both military and political, also maintain personal and familial ties with Gulf monarchies, further bolstering these informal channels.

Beyond the matter of diplomacy, the Gulf countries have also been vital to Pakistan’s economic stability, repeatedly stepping in with financial bailouts and oil on deferred payments during periods of heightened tension or near-conflict. Without this consistent support, Pakistan’s economy could have potentially collapsed multiple times under war pressure. That being said, it must also be noted that Saudi and the UAE are major players in the secularization and de-Islamization of Muslims across the world.

RELATED: Israel’s Post-Gaza Plan: Deepening Israel-UAE’s “Abrahamic” Authoritarianism in the UK

There’s also another dimension to Pan-Islamic solidarity, though this time from outside the Arab world: Türkiye. The Turkish-Pakistani relationship is rooted in history, going back to when Muslims in British India supported Turkey during its War of Independence (1919–1923). This legacy created a deep, bipartisan admiration in Türkiye, embraced by both “Islamists” and Kemalists.

In recent years, that diplomatic bond has turned into a strategic defense partnership. Türkiye’s growing defense industry, best characterized by its Bayraktar UAVs (or “drones”) that have been combat-tested in multiple conflict zones, is now a source of military collaboration. Pakistan’s air force and navy are increasingly benefiting from Turkish expertise and hardware. Recently, both countries announced their plans to jointly produce the KAAN 5th-generation fighter jet, reflecting this deepening of strategic ties.

These alliances aren’t based on ethnicity or language but, rather, on a shared Islamic identity—a clear manifestation of Pan-Islamism that continues to serve as a buffer against Indian military dominance.

Remove the Pan-Islamic dimension, and Pakistan is left with only China as a counterweight to India. While Beijing is certainly a powerful deterrent, its support is strategic rather than loyalty based on shared values. It is also less ideologically resonant than states brought together by being part of the same Muslim ummah.

In short, Pan-Islamism remains a key geopolitical shield of sorts for Pakistan, diplomatically, economically, and, increasingly, militarily. Any rational actor would be cognizant of the multifaceted benefits that it entails.

Conversely, secularism in Pakistan is undeniably a highly damaging factor to the strength and stability of the country. Likewise, a secular approach to foreign policy and security strategy could also be seen as undermining the country’s national defense.

RELATED: Pakistan’s Youth Yearn for an “Islamic Dictatorship”