More than a month into the U.S.-Israel offensive against Iran, informally dubbed “Operation Epstein Fury,” the conflict has now culminated in what is being described as a ceasefire brokered through Pakistan – well, supposedly.

In the immediate discourse, particularly across Iranian official channels, the outcome is being framed through a lens of civilizational resilience and “victory,” with some Iranian officials using Qur’anic verses to mark their triumphalism.

But is it truly a victory? Let us analyze the issue and also weigh up the arguments emerging from within Iran itself, including from those who oppose the ceasefire and view it not as an interruption but a conclusion.

Asymmetric Warfare and a Different Form of Success

At the systemic level, the confrontation reproduced a classic asymmetry: a global superpower, i.e., the United States, which possesses defense expenditures exceeding $850 billion annually and unmatched force projection capabilities, engaged a regional middle power operating under sanctions with an estimated military budget closer to $20–25 billion. Within such asymmetries, the strategic metric is not territorial conquest. It is regime continuity.

By this standard, Tehran being able to avoid regime collapse, territorial occupation, or enforced disarmament constitutes a baseline success. Washington’s maximalist rhetoric (including threats of existential-scale destruction) was not operationalized, and the transition from coercive signaling to negotiated de-escalation underscores a gap between declared and executed strategy.

The escalation ladder further reveals a deterrence equilibrium that is unfavorable to the initiating power. In the final phase preceding the ceasefire, U.S. military planning included expanded strikes on critical infrastructure, potentially targeting energy nodes and command-and-control systems. The pivot toward ceasefire (rather than escalation) suggests that Tehran succeeded in raising the expected costs of continued conflict beyond acceptable thresholds.

This aligns with deterrence theory: rather than parity of force, the credibility of retaliation shapes outcomes. Iran’s posture effectively increased the marginal cost of each additional step up the escalation ladder, inducing strategic restraint in Washington.

Central to this cost imposition was the geoeconomic leverage of the Strait of Hormuz. Approximately 20–30% of globally traded seaborne oil (roughly 10 to 12 million barrels per day) transits this corridor under normal conditions. Even partial disruption introduces immediate volatility into energy markets, with price spikes historically exceeding 20–30% during crises. By demonstrating credible capacity to interfere with this flow, Iran effectively converted geography into coercive leverage. The linkage of ceasefire terms to the reopening and stabilization of this maritime artery indicates that global economic externalities, not purely military considerations, became decisive in shaping conflict termination.

Pushing the argument further, one could plausibly contend (provocatively but not entirely inaccurately) that Iranian leverage over the Strait of Hormuz has, in certain respects, generated a form of coercive power that is more immediately usable and strategically flexible than nuclear deterrence.

Also, that old debate between calling it the “Arabian Gulf” or the “Persian Gulf” seems to now have been decisively settled.

Negotiation Dynamics

Negotiation dynamics further reinforce this asymmetry inversion: available reporting suggests that the ceasefire framework drew significantly from Iranian proposals, including provisions related to sanctions relief, recognition (implicit or explicit) of enrichment activities, and non-aggression assurances. In bargaining theory, the actor that sets the agenda often captures disproportionate political gains. Even partial adoption of Tehran’s framework signals that the post-conflict equilibrium reflects (at least in part) Iranian preference ordering rather than unilateral imposition by Washington.

A more cynical reading circulating among analysts is that a few weeks of coercive escalation achieved what decades of negotiations did not: at least partial sanctions relief for Iran, with immediate implications for internal power dynamics.

Even limited easing (formal or de facto) can translate into substantial revenue: restoring just ~1 million barrels/day of exports at ~$70 per barrel yields roughly $25 billion annually. When combined with leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran gains an additional geoeconomic instrument, as even “modest” transit tolls, reported at up to ~$1 per barrel or as much as $1–2 million per tanker, scale into a significant revenue stream given baseline traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

In normal conditions, roughly 80–120 vessels transit daily, many of which are large crude carriers. At those levels, even partial normalization, say 30–50 tankers per day under controlled access, could generate on the order of $30–100 million daily, implying roughly $10–35 billion annually if institutionalized. Individual VLCC payments alone can reach ~$2 million per crossing.

More structurally, the imposition of a toll regime alters the “sanctions architecture” itself. If transit through Hormuz becomes conditional on payment to Iran, then any state importing Gulf energy is, by definition, engaging in a financial transaction with Tehran. Given that ~20% of global oil flows through this corridor, this creates a systemic constraint. Enforcing secondary sanctions would imply sanctioning a large share of the global economy, including major importers in Asia. In effect, the toll mechanism not only generates revenue; it embeds Iran into the circulation of global trade flows, making broad-based sanctions enforcement economically and politically prohibitive.

This whole outcome strengthens the position of the “principlist” (so-called “far-right”) camp, accounting for roughly 25–30% of the population but dominant within state institutions, which has long argued that resistance yields results, unlike engagement with the United States and its partners. Conversely, reformist factions, whose legitimacy depended on durable sanctions relief through diplomacy, particularly after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), are further weakened.

The political signal is clear: if escalation produces tangible economic gains (tens of billions in oil revenue plus potential Hormuz-derived income), while diplomacy delivered reversible outcomes, then coercive bargaining becomes the more credible strategy within Iran’s elite decision-making structure.

American Material Losses

The economic dimension of the conflict also reveals structural strain: estimates of U.S. operational expenditures in high-intensity regional conflicts typically range from $2–5 billion per week, implying cumulative costs plausibly exceeding $80–120 billion over a month-long campaign when factoring in deployment, munitions expenditure, and logistical overhead. Against this, Iran’s strategy aligns with cost-imposition warfare: absorbing infrastructural and military losses (anticipated within its strategic doctrine), while ensuring that the adversary’s marginal costs escalate faster than its own.

And, indeed, reports of U.S. asset attrition were financially significant, especially when contrasted with Iran’s low-cost drone doctrine. A single F-15E Strike Eagle, valued at roughly $90–100 million, was confirmed shot down over Iranian territory, while at least three additional F-15Es were lost earlier (including a friendly-fire incident), representing roughly $280–300 million in losses.

Supporting aircraft losses compound this. Two MC-130J Commando II (each worth over $100 million) were destroyed during a rescue operation, while tanker aircraft like the KC-135 (~$80 million each) and multiple drones such as the MQ-9 Reaper (~$30 million per unit) were also lost or damaged.

In aggregate, open-source estimates place total aircraft and aerial system losses in the low single-digit billions of dollars within a few weeks. By contrast, Iran’s primary aerial strike instrument, the Shahed-136, costs approximately $20,000–50,000 per unit, with some saying even less. This implies that the destruction of a single $100 million U.S. aircraft is economically equivalent to roughly 2,000–5,000 Shahed drones, and the loss of just the two MC-130Js (~$200+ million total) corresponds to the production cost of potentially 4,000–10,000 drones.

This cost asymmetry is central. Iran’s strategy does not require air superiority in the conventional sense. Instead, it leverages saturation and attrition, forcing a technologically superior adversary to expend (or lose) assets whose replacement cost is many orders of magnitude higher. In economic terms, the exchange ratio consistently favors Tehran, turning even limited U.S. losses into disproportionately costly setbacks.

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Iran’s Material Losses

Critically, the conflict did not result in irreversible degradation of Iran’s core strategic capabilities. Its nuclear infrastructure (dispersed, hardened, and partially redundant) remains operational to a significant degree. Missile forces, including medium-range ballistic systems, appear largely intact. Its network of non-state and semi-state partners across the region also continues to function as a force multiplier. The absence of enforced disarmament or intrusive verification mechanisms implies that the structural balance of power in the region remains fundamentally unchanged.

Iran’s regional strategy throughout the conflict illustrates a form of horizontal escalation management. Rather than concentrating exclusively on bilateral confrontation, Tehran leveraged affiliated actors in Iraq and other theaters to apply distributed pressure on U.S. assets. Simultaneously, calibrated disruptions in maritime security and implicit threats to Gulf infrastructure expanded the battlespace without triggering full-scale regional war. This multi-vector approach complicates adversary decision-making by introducing cascading risks: escalation in one domain generates unpredictable spillovers in others, from energy markets to allied security commitments.

Destroying Atlantism in Europe and the “Abraham Accords” in the GCC

Diplomatically, the episode exposed not only fissures within the Western alignment but also fractures inside the Gulf bloc itself. European actors, most notably France, prioritized rapid de-escalation, reflecting both acute exposure to energy price volatility and limited political appetite for a prolonged high-intensity conflict. At the same time, the emergence of Pakistan as a possible “mediator,” if it isn’t all just for show, would point to a more multipolar crisis-management framework in which Washington is no longer the sole agenda-setter.

More significantly, the conflict appears to have strained the internal cohesion of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). While United Arab Emirates and Bahrain maintained a comparatively hardline alignment with U.S. and Israeli positions, consistent with their security dependencies and prior normalization dynamics, other Gulf actors adopted more cautious or hedging postures, prioritizing de-escalation and economic stability. Given that Gulf economies remain structurally dependent on uninterrupted hydrocarbon exports, much of which transits the Strait of Hormuz, the risks of escalation translated directly into existential economic concerns.

This divergence effectively weakened the GCC as a unified diplomatic actor, isolating the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain within the regional consensus and reducing the coherence of the broader pro-U.S. alignment. It also devalued the strategic utility of the Abraham Accords. Those agreements were premised on a gradual consolidation of an overt or tacit anti-Iran axis under U.S. sponsorship. The current fragmentation instead highlights their limits under conditions of high-intensity conflict. Rather than producing a cohesive regional bloc, the crisis revealed divergent threat perceptions and risk tolerances, with several Gulf and Arab actors prioritizing de-escalation and economic continuity over alignment with Israeli or U.S. escalation dynamics.

For Washington, this compounded the challenge: not only was transatlantic unity incomplete, even its core regional partners displayed fragmentation. The net effect was a dilution of coalition leverage and an increased reliance on external mediators, reinforcing the shift toward a more pluralized and less U.S.-centric diplomatic landscape.

And thus, from now on, a number of Gulf decision-makers may now reassess their strategic calculus and consider a partial rebalancing toward Iran rather than exclusive reliance on U.S. security guarantees or overt alignment with Israel.

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…Iran’s Human Losses?

The informational and psychological domain further shapes outcome perception. Iranian authorities have framed the ceasefire as evidence of strategic steadfastness, reinforcing domestic legitimacy and projecting resilience externally. Conversely, the discrepancy between U.S. maximalist rhetoric and negotiated de-escalation risks generating perceptions of overextension or credibility erosion. In international politics, such perceptions influence future deterrence calculations, alliance confidence, and adversary risk tolerance.

Ultimately, the evaluation of outcomes depends on goal attainment. If Washington’s implicit objectives included dismantling Iran’s nuclear capacity, compelling strategic capitulation, or inducing regime destabilization, the available evidence suggests these were not achieved. By contrast, Tehran’s core objectives (regime survival, preservation of strategic programs, elevation of the costs of external intervention, and engagement on negotiated terms) appear substantially realized. In this sense, the conflict reinforces a recurrent pattern in asymmetric warfare: The weaker actor does not need to win conventionally to achieve favorable political outcomes. It must merely prevent the stronger actor from translating military superiority into decisive strategic transformation.

Some observers would point to Iran’s human losses, including civilians and senior leadership figures, notably Ayatollah Khamenei on day one, as evidence of strategic setback.

However, this interpretation overlooks a central ideological and sociopolitical dimension: Within the heterodox Shi’i framework of Iran, martyrdom is not merely a “cost.” It is a mechanism of political reproduction and legitimacy. In Shi’i political theology, sacrifice, especially at the leadership level, can reinforce regime cohesion rather than weaken it. The historical paradigm of Karbala institutionalizes the idea that elite loss, even at the highest level, transforms into symbolic capital: it mobilizes the population, legitimizes continued resistance, and reframes material damage as moral victory.

In practical terms, the removal of individuals does not necessarily degrade the system’s functionality, which is structured around redundancy and ideological continuity rather than personalist rule. At the same time, focusing exclusively on Iranian losses obscures the broader casualty balance.

Official U.S. figures acknowledge at least 13 fatalities among American service members and over 300 wounded, with earlier Pentagon estimates already exceeding 140 injuries in the first few weeks alone. Independent estimates suggest total U.S. casualties (killed + wounded) plausibly in the several hundreds, with some claims placing the figure significantly higher when accounting for indirect or unreported losses.

In modern expeditionary warfare, where political sensitivity to casualties is high, even these numbers can generate disproportionate domestic and strategic pressure.

This asymmetry, again, is crucial: for Iran, human losses, while substantial, with civilian deaths exceeding 1,500 and total fatalities likely in the low thousands, can be integrated into a narrative of resistance and sacrifice. For the United States, by contrast, casualties, especially in a distant, non-existential conflict, translate directly into political cost, media scrutiny, and constraints on escalation.

In other words, what appears as a “loss” in conventional military accounting does not carry the same strategic meaning on both sides: Iran’s doctrinal framework partially neutralizes the political impact of casualties. As for the U.S., even limited losses contribute to the cumulative pressure to de-escalate.

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…But a Ceasefire?

Here I would like to present another view as well, as hinted in the introduction: those who are critical of the ceasefire itself. This is not simply because any ceasefire involving Israel is seen as hugely unreliable (as I write, Israelis are already provoking in Lebanon) but also because they argue that the very logic of a ceasefire interrupted momentum in a war that Iran was, as we’ve seen, structurally winning, without any clear depletion of its capabilities.

From a principlist (“far-right”) perspective inside Iran, the key issue is timing, as the trajectory seemed favorable: costs on the United States and its partners were rising across the board (economic strain, asset losses, political pressure) while Iran’s core strike capacity remained far from exhausted.

If anything, estimates of Iran’s arsenal suggest depth well beyond what is usually acknowledged in Western discourse. Ballistic missile inventories are often assessed in the several thousands, with some higher-end estimates pushing toward 3,000–5,000 systems when including short- and medium-range variants. But the real asymmetry lies in drones: pre-war stockpiles and production capacity for systems like the Shahed series are frequently estimated in the tens of thousands, with some claims reaching significantly higher when accounting for sustained industrial output and simplified manufacturing. In other words: even after weeks of attrition, there is no clear indication of systemic depletion.

So the principlist argument is blunt: Why stop now? If the marginal cost curve was still shifting against the adversary, through continued missile pressure, drone saturation, proxy activity, and especially disruption around the Strait of Hormuz, then prolongation would likely have increased leverage even further.

In this reading, the ceasefire didn’t put a stop to a deteriorating situation; it halted a favorable one. It consolidated gains, yes, but it also prevented their full exploitation. And with thousands of missiles and potentially tens (if not far more) of thousands of drones still available or producible, the claim is that Iran had not reached the ceiling of its coercive capacity, but, rather, it chose (politically) to pause before fully capitalizing on it.

I’m sure Iranian policy-makers, especially their new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, himself a principlist with a well-known interest in military and security affairs, are fully aware of all of this and have been thoroughly briefed, notably by the Supreme National Security Council, whose new head (following the death of Ali Larijani), Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, is known to be a so-called “hardliner.”

The decision to accept a ceasefire is therefore not about ignorance of Iran’s remaining leverage. It is a conscious political choice about timing and limits.

Nonetheless, I thought it was worth pointing this out for readers too, because it shows that even within Iran’s own strategic thinking, the ceasefire is not necessarily seen as the natural endpoint of the dynamic.

At the very least, though, the ceasefire brings something more immediate and tangible: a pause. Even if temporary, it offers a moment of relief for the Iranian population (and for their families in the diaspora that are not brainwashed Pahlavists) after weeks of sustained pressure and uncertainty.

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