The war in Yemen has become emblematic of 21st century conflicts in the middle east, pitting Muslims against one another on purportedly sectarian grounds.

It has led to much suffering, loss of life, infrastructural damage, and poverty, resulting in the once prosperous lands of Yemen being reduced to rubble.

The wounds of the violence there are felt by Muslims all over the world (along with the ongoing bloodshed in Syria and Palestine), as the Prophet ﷺ said in an authentic narration:

“O Allah! Bless our Sham and our Yemen.”[1]

Perhaps in affirmation of the blessings the Prophet ﷺ supplicated for, the Muslims of Yemen have shown exceptional resilience in the face of overwhelming odds, and they are one of the most vocal critics of the ongoing Israeli genocide. Over the course of many centuries, the demographic composition of Yemen has become unevenly divided between the mostly Shi’ah city of Sana’a and surrounding regions, with a Sunni majority everywhere else. Unlike most other populations such as those found in Iran or other parts of the Arab world, the Yemeni Shi’ah fall under the category of a unique branch known as “Zaydi” Shi’ism. Being doctrinally far closer to the positions of Ahl al-Sunnah on many key issues, the Zaydis have lived under various Sunni polities (at least nominally) for much of their recent history. Though this has never been completely without resistance, as will be further discussed, both the Sunni and Zaydi leadership of the early 20th century would be forced to put aside their differences and engage in multiple attempts at unity in the face of a greater enemy. 

Yemen in Recent History

The most recent Islamic empire to hold sway over Yemen was the Ottoman Caliphate. Like the sultanates that preceded it (and arguably moreso), Ottoman rule included both periods of tyrannical despotism, mostly at the hands of local governors; and also justice and genuine concern to improve the state of the people. In contrast with the more centralized parts of the empire, Yemen happened to be quite difficult to control due to its distance from the capital and its unique political circumstances, contributing to the poor quality of governorship it experienced. The Ottomans first conquered the territories of modern Yemen with the fall of the Mamluk state in 1517, but they were driven out by the Qasimid Zaydi dynasty by the 17th century, only to reconquer Sana’a by 1849. The Ottoman state still often controlled large swathes of territory either directly or through local vassals between those two periods.

It is a point of oft-forgotten history that, until around the mid-20th century, the Zaydi population of Yemen was both politically and religiously under the authority of a series of hereditary imams, in theory, rival claimants to what we consider khilafah or leadership of the ummah. These Zaydi imams, though at times willing subjects of the Sunni caliphs in Istanbul, considered it a sacred duty to resist what they perceived as injustice, often relating to the enforcement of Hanafi law in the region and the collection of taxes. This created a noteworthy paradox, where the theologically closer Zaydi clergy was far more consistent in engaging in rebellion against the Sunni Ottomans than the Twelver Shi’ah in Iraq and Lebanon, who had no comparable central leadership at the time. On the other hand, factional strife between various claimants to the Zaydi imamate was perhaps the greatest single factor in the relative destabilization of Yemen as an imperial province, though British colonial propaganda (and modern Arab nationalism) often tried to emphasize Ottoman incompetence as the root of the issue:

“English authors and travellers have put forward views based on unreliable data … to suggest that Ottoman misrule was at the core of the problem. In fact, instability caused by intense rivalry over the imamate had a lot more to do with the lack of administrative stability than wilful mismanagement through the officials’ alleged greed.”[2]

This is not to say that certain Turkish officials did not exceed the boundaries of the Shari’ah, especially after the Tanzimat period, where the secularization and rapid modernization led to increasing religious violations from the perspective of Muslim subjects. Rather, what is quite important to understand is that the Zaydi population did not consistently view the Sunni Ottomans as enemies. Most of the conflicts therein were due to political strife between individual imams attempting to supplant pretender claimants, either of which may have been backed directly by Istanbul. Indeed, Zaydi imams were given significant political autonomy and often served as Ottoman governors in all but name. In other words, this was not truly a Sunni-Shi’ah sectarian conflict for the most part, in contrast with the contemporaneous Safavid wars. The events that would unfold over the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries are a demonstration of this fact.

RELATED: The Ottoman Devşirme vs the Modern Liberal Education System

Struggle for South Arabia

As recent global events have shown, two geographic chokepoints of immense strategic value surround the territories of the Arabian peninsula, these being the Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab straits. The significance of these straits was known to colonial powers as early as the 16th century, when the Portuguese attempted to wrestle the strategic chokepoints out of the hands of local Muslim powers. After failing to take the Yemeni city of Aden on multiple separate occasions, the Portuguese were driven out completely by the Ottoman navy in 1538. One of the key reasons for the importance of the Bab al-Mandab straits was also its importance in protecting the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah, which the colonial powers showed an almost obsessive intent to destroy. 

By the 1800s, Portuguese imperial power had long since waned, and it was replaced by the rapidly ascending British naval dominance around the Arabian peninsula. In the Persian Gulf, the English repeated the strategy of their colonial predecessors by attempting to establish control over the strait through various island bases and the territories of modern-day UAE (known then as the Trucial States, first established as a subject of the British crown). As for Bab al-Mandab, British troops landed on the shores of Aden in 1839, eventually turning the entire southern coast of Yemen into a series of protectorates. After a century of relatively light-handed policy towards southern Arabia, the Ottoman policy would shift dramatically to preserve Islamic rule over the rest of the region:

“The attack on what they saw as the back door to the holiest shrines of Islam was interpreted as part of a British design on Yemen as a whole … These led to the re-establishment of direct (Ottoman) rule over Yemen in an attempt to prevent the expansion of British influence and control out of the Aden enclave.”[3]

Tribal conflicts and a large number of simultaneous claimants to the position of Zaydi imam made local resistance to European encroachment virtually impossible. Seeing the chaos that the Muslims were embroiled in, the ‘ulama’ of Sana’a, both Sunni and Shi’ah, banded together and made the historically significant decision to request the intervention of the Ottoman caliph:

“All the imams and many ulema, notables and heads of tribes decided to call on the Ottoman sultan-caliph Abdülmecid (through the intercession of Sharif Muhammad Ibn ‘Awn of Mecca) to come to their aid … An expedition led by Tevfik Pasha reached Sana’a in July 1849 and was welcomed by (the Zaydi) imam al-Mutawakkil outside the city”[4]

Although this acquiescence to the Ottomans was not the end of the civil strife in the area, the arrival of the Sultan’s forces no doubt halted colonial incursion into Sana’a for over half a century. All modern coastal gulf states (with the notable exception of Qatar) were incepted within this period through British expansionism, even before the first world war and the subsequent Arab Revolt. Interestingly, the borders established between the Ottoman Empire and Britain continue to mirror the political divisions of Yemen to this day.

RELATED: The Hidden Shia Agenda of The Muslim Vibe

Caliph in Istanbul, Imam in Sana’a

Over the following decades, the parts of Yemen that were under Ottoman rule continued to experience civil disorder and proved to remain difficult to govern. Funds required for improving both the civilian and military infrastructure were hard to come by as the usurious debt accrued by the “Sublime Porte” beginning in 1855 would pile up rapidly. To make matters worse, the British were actively involved in fomenting rebellion against the caliphate among Muslim groups all over Arabia, including the Zaydis. They did this to open up the doors for Western colonization of the rest of the peninsula. Sultan Abdul Hamid II (may Allah have mercy on him) invested a large amount of effort into the Yemeni situation and refrained from relying solely on violence to establish order in the region.

It is in this context that the Porte sent Hasan Khalid Abu al-Huda, the son of the esteemed Abu al-Huda al-Sayyadi (may Allah have mercy on him), as well as an attache of officials to negotiate with the Zaydi imam (known as Mansur) and re-establish unity among local Muslims in 1902. Imam Mansur sent his cousin Sayyid Ahmad ibn Qasim to meet with the delegation near Sana’a, though the request was for him to participate directly, citing his old age and illness. The events of this meeting are quite interesting:

“According to Hasan Khalid Bey, that day, six hundred Ottoman soldiers and over two thousand armed Zaydis performed the Friday congregational prayer together, with ‘sincere respect and courtesy’”[5]

After this noteworthy display of brotherhood between the Ottoman soldiers and their Yemeni counterparts, the imam’s cousin is reported to have given a powerful (and highly relevant) speech:

“There is no discord within the bond of Islamic brotherhood that unites Turk and Arab, and therefore there ought to be no bloodshed among Muslims, nor should the path be opened for those opposed to religion and faith (referring to the British colonialists) to interfere. This is the purpose intended [by us]: to make known and proclaim to all the inhabitants dwelling in this blessed land of Yemen – [that we], with the aim of protecting our clear religion, have given due regard and consideration to the exhortations and the timely counsel conveyed by this honored delegation sent by our glorious caliph…”[6]

Hasan Khalid continued in his dialogues with the imam and local Zaydi clergy, and it was made clear based on the correspondence that Mansur did indeed consider Sultan Abdul Hamid to be the caliph of all Muslims, and he had no qualms with him. He only objected to the acts of injustice carried out by some of his Pashas. What both the imam in Sana’a and the caliph in Istanbul definitely agreed upon however, at least on paper, was the urgency of driving out the infidels from Yemen:

“Likewise, in another letter written to Ali al-Mujahid … it was underlined that all necessary assistance for the sake of the shari’a would be given together against “the enemy infidels”. In other words, this shows a shared attitude – one worth noting, since it reveals a shared stance held between the sultan and the imam – namely that, particularly, strangers/foreigners who were enemies of the “ümmet-i Muhammed” [the Community of Muhammad] must be driven out of Yemen.”[7]

Imam Mansur passed away in 1904, and his son Yahya Muhammad Hamid al-Din succeeded him as the Zaydi imam. After some outbreaks of violence between the Turks and Yahya, the sultan once again opened negotiations with the imam starting from 1906. These talks continued into the Young Turk era and were only concluded in 1911 with the treaty of Daan. The treaty allowed the imams to govern in the Yemeni highlands independent in all but name, enforce Zaydi jurisprudence, and receive a monthly stipend, in return for cessation of hostilities. 

When the first world war erupted across Europe and the Middle East, the Zaydi imamate under Yahya sided with the Ottomans against the British, proving that the words of his father were not hollow. Their united forces served as a real threat to the British in south Arabia:

“In Yemen, when Ottoman troops allied with imam Yahya, the ruler of Sana’a, laid siege to the British colony of Aden in July 1915, British officials feared the loss of prestige would encourage the proponents of jihad in the Arabian Peninsula.”[8]

This fear was abated with the Arab Revolt of 1916, which snuffed out any chances of a united Muslim front against the colonialists. Following the subsequent collapse of the caliphate, the fully independent “Mutawakkilite” Kingdom of Yemen was joined by a number of local Ottoman officers who refused to surrender to the British. The Zaydi imamate would go on to be abolished after a republican coup decades later in 1967.

Although the early modern history of Yemen cannot be reduced to any single trend, consisting of both ups and downs, it is nonetheless an enlightening example of how crucial the institution of khilafah is for the accomplishment of Islamic unity. While the Muslim ‘ulama’ of even rebellious territories recognized the authority of the caliph and called upon him at times of disagreement, injustice, or in the case of war with the disbelievers, modern Muslims tend to rely instead almost entirely on the intervention of United Nations security forces or other kafir polities. Many Muslim nations engage in crimes and violations on a massive scale with no accountability to any overarching Islamic authority who holds the best interests of the ummah in mind, and the case of Yemen is just one of many such examples.

And Allah ﷻ knows best.

RELATED: Early Muslim Encounters with Feminism: Women’s Education in the Late Ottoman Empire

Notes

[1] Sahih al-Bukhari, Book 15 (“Invoking Allah for Rain”), Hadith 1037, narrated by Ibn ‘Umar, https://sunnah.com/bukhari:1037.

[2] Caesar E. Farah, “The Sultan’s Yemen: Nineteenth-Century Challenges to Ottoman Rule” (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), p. 61.

[3] Ibid, p. 30.

[4] Ibid, p. 59.

[5] Muharrem Varol, “The Ottoman Advice Delegation Sent to Yemen in 1902 and The Reports of Hasan Halid: A Sheikh Son in Yemen Provinces,” in VIII. International Turkology Congress Book, vol. 4, ed. Mustafa Özkan and Enfel Doğan (Istanbul, 2014), 952–981, p. 963.

[6] Ibid, pp. 963–966.

[7] Ibid, p. 969.

[8] Eugene Rogan, “Rival Jihads: Islam and the Great War in the Middle East, 1914–1918” (Elie Kedourie Memorial Lecture, read 8 July 2014), Journal of the British Academy 4 (2016): 1–20, p. 13.